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I.

WHY STUDY CAUSE LAWYERS?

Lawyers for social causes are familiar in America. "Cause lawyering," described

as law practice "furthering a vision of the good society,"' is also global. Although
American scholars trace its origins to liberal legalism and movements for civil rights
in the United States and Europe, 2 cause lawyering has become increasingly visible on
the world stage in societies whose legal traditions are very different, although most
case studies of successful cause lawyers come from developed democracies, their
former colonies, and especially those societies influenced by the common law.3
Thailand, the site of my research, is an Asian society with a long history of
4
authoritarian government and a legal system influenced by civil law traditions.
Unique among Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has never been colonized or
subjugated to European law. We may fairly ask, then, why would individuals drawn
to social advocacy choose to deploy a symbolic resource such as law, and especially
the "rule of law," against a powerful government in a society where law has uncertain
legitimacy and legal advocacy has unproven power? Observing the growing global
attraction to rights advocacy under circumstances such as these, legal anthropologist
Sally Engle Merry sensibly concludes that "[t]aking on rights is a difficult process
and fraught with ambivalence. Asserting rights often comes at a price."'
Cause lawyers, of course, are not typical anywhere, and that is why they are
interesting. In the United States, cause lawyering is related to an important aspiration
of client-centered professionalism-achieving justice for each client and placing that
goal at times ahead of making money and personal benefit.6 Many lawyers, though
1.

Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of ProfessionalAuthority: An

Introduction, in CAUSE

LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

3, 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).

2.

See generally

STUART

A.

SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,

PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING

23-50 (2004) (providing a historical context of cause

lawyering).
3.

See generally CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds.,
2006) (containing essays relating to the life cycle of social movements and the effect that cause lawyers
and the social movements have on one another); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA

(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) (containing essays relating to cause lawyering in, among
other locations, Ghana, the United Kingdom, Latin America, the United States, and Israel); LAW AND
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos &
C6sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005) (focusing on the changes in legal institutions against the
backdrop of globalization through a collection of essays); THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE:
STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005)
(containing essays highlighting the breadth of causes served and providing information on case studies
from India, Argentina, and the United Kingdom); Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 1, at 5-7 (contrasting,
at a superficial level, the development of cause lawyering in common law and civil societies, as well as in
rule-of-law systems and authoritarian regimes).
4.

See discussion infra Part IV.

See generally CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF

THAILAND (2005).
5.

SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW

INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 216 (2006).
6.

A fundamental principle of the lawyer-client relationships in Anglo-Saxon law is client loyalty;
accordingly, a lawyer's judgment and effort is exercised "solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980)
(correlating with Model Rules 1.7(a), 1.8(c)-(g) & (j)). As amplified by aspirational statements within
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choosing a more traditional practice recognize the importance and legitimacy of
cause lawyering, if not the legitimacy of everything that cause lawyers do. Even
lawyers who are not and will never be activists defend the profession's activism, its

involvement in public interest law, pro bono requirements, and law reform because
they believe that these activities reflect the profession's political independence and
power, as well as its entitlement to public respect. These symbolic resources are
assets that legitimize the deep involvement of lawyers in the development of society

through policy-making, international relations, and overall political life. The
viability of cause lawyering as a career may indeed be a good measure of the legal
profession's political independence and power and may illuminate the role and
legitimacy of law in a society.
The strength of the American legal profession, and its cause lawyers, is closely
related to America's unique political institutions. Other societies, like Thailand,
whose history and institutions create a different and more limited role for law in
contention for power, provide less promising terrain for cause lawyers. No one
doubts the power of lawyers in the United States.7 "In the US," write scholars Yves

Dezalay and Bryant Garth, "'symbolic innovators' ... gravitate to the powerful and
relatively autonomous professional milieus."8 In other words, in the United States

ambitious activists often pursue some type of public interest law practice. My study
asks why, in spite of Thailand's less promising terrain, do Thai activists invest in law
and what do they achieve by doing so? Answering these questions will help us
understand the practical meaning of "rule of law" in Thailand from an important
perspective: lawyers seeking to open greater political space for social causes.

the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as
statements of purpose of virtually every bar association, lawyers maintain a stance of seeking the full
measure of justice on behalf of clients.
7.

Many studies amply demonstrate the power of lawyers and law firms in American policy making. See,
e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAwYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
(1976); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE

LITIGATION CRISIS 116-20 (2004); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 50 (2005); Robert Gordon, Lawyers andLegal Thought in theAge of Enterprise,
inPROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); Ronan
Shamir, Professionalism and the Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers andAdministrative Law 1933-1937, 27
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 361 (1993). Counterintuitively, a study of the role of Washington, D.C., law firms
in the policy making processes of Congress and administrative agencies suggests that they may be less
involved in policy making than their reputation, based upon a myth of lawyer dominance, suggests. See
Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the Structure ofInfluence in Washington, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 237
(1988). On the influential role of lawyers in foreign policy from the late nineteenth century onward, see
Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 718 (2008). Famed French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu comments that the far greater power
of lawyers in the common law legal tradition than in the civil law tradition begins with the authoritative
interpretation of law by courts in the common law tradition and, in turn, the power of lawyers to
influence interpretation. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force ofLaw Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38
HASTINGS LJ. 814, 822 (1987).
8.

YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G.

GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,

ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 55-56 (2002).
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Research that involves charting social justice lawyers' careers is a new strategy
with great potential in the field of socio-legal studies of the rule of law in developing
societies. Dezalay and Garth's groundbreaking comparative study of the political
independence of lawyers in the United States and Latin America relied on
microhistories of lawyers' careers.' Their interviews tapped the local and intimate
knowledge of the power and limitations of law that is required for the successful
pursuit of a legal career and for the deployment of the symbolic resources at the
profession's disposal. Similarly, my collective biography of social justice lawyers in
Thailand potentially provides a rich mapping of the paths open to those who choose
law and of the opportunities to use law to influence other institutions of the society,
especially government.
This article provides a preliminary report of research based on interviews
conducted in Thailand with Thai lawyers and other activists on behalf of a wide
variety of politically weak or socially disadvantaged groups seeking equality, power,
or merely recognition for their causes. The multi-generational and variously
committed ensemble of interviewees permits comparison of the opportunities,
limitations, and successes and failures of law in many contexts, increasing the
likelihood of observing patterns. In my interviews, I ask when and how they use the
law on behalf of social movements and causes, about their methods of work and how
they support themselves, about the nature of their clients or other work if their work
is not for specific clients, and about their successes and failures. I chart their careers,
how and why they entered the profession, their networks of collaborators, and, as
accurately as possible, the mentors, role-models, or institutions that taught them or
directed their career paths. I pay particular attention to the networks and movements
they attempt to build and to their perceptions of their own work.
Part II of this article describes the origin of the concept of cause lawyering, the
paradoxes of its attractiveness outside the safe haven of developed, liberal democracies,
and the dependence of law on a unique and uncertain process of adaptation in each
developing society. Part III describes the strengths of the research strategy employed
by this study, which is a multi-generational collective biography. Part IV introduces
four Thai social justice lawyers, describes their careers, and sets forth the historical
context of each. Part V discusses what the narratives reveal about the influence of
social change on the four careers described in Part IV. Part VI, my conclusion, offers
a brief speculation about the effects of social justice law practice on achievement of
the "good society"--a vision in which the rule of law becomes a means to greater
political space for the social causes of the lawyers-and what we might learn from
fuller examination of cause lawyers' careers.

9.

See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, ConstructingLaw Out of Power: Investing in Human Rights as an
AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 3, at

Alternative PoliticalStrategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING
354; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 8.
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I1. CAUSE LAWYERS IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A rapidly growing literature on cause lawyering takes liberal legalism as its
starting point.' ° Liberal legalism, the dominant legal ideology in developed Western
democracies, combines two conflicting premises. First, liberal legalism incorporates
the rule of law, a concept that encompasses procedures that serve to legitimize the
state's authority. 1 Second, liberal legalism establishes absolute limits on the state's
authority that protect autonomy, equality, and other individual and community
values. 2 Lawyers, as members of a profession privileged by the state, stand between
these two potentially conflicting mandates, serving by grace of the state's authority
but often challenging the state's authority for transgressions of substantive rights.
Under liberal legalism, lawyers exercise their privileges to mobilize the law with
some degree of immunity from reprisal or interference even when they invoke rights
that challenge the state's authority. 3 Emphasis on individual rights creates space for
advocacy not only for existing rights, but also for the expansion of rights and even for
new rights that will bring about substantial social change on behalf of individuals or
the public generally.14 In the United States, cause lawyers have often succeeded in
their advocacy for new rights that impose limits on the state and have rarely faced
reprisal for their advocacy." For this reason, scholarship about U.S. cause lawyers
has focused less on the consequences of conflict with the state than on lawyers'
motivation, the structure of their practices, and the roles they play in movements for
social justice.
This picture changes in societies where assumptions about the rule of law, rights,
and the lawyer's professional role are quite different. In many societies, "speaking
law to power" 6 risks more serious reprisal than in Western democracies. Professor
Richard Abel's examination of the institutional sources of opportunity for cause
lawyering worldwide suggests that both liberal legal ideology and the institutional
and political framework of a society are important. 17 The United States' well10.

See SCHEINOOLD & SARAT, supra note 2; Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 1.

11.

See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 92 (2004).

12.

See id. at 110-11.

13.

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1242-46 (1991); David
Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 877-80 (1980). There is a large
literature on zealous advocacy and nonaccountability as professional norms.

14.

See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 2, at 13-14. But liberal legalism does not encompass advocacy for
changes in the basic institutions of society or change by means other than advocacy for rights through
the court system. See id. at 15-17.

15.

See Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power" Occasionsfor Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 1, at 69.

16.

Id. Abel's use of the phrase "speaking law to power" is a play on the claim made by some activists that
"speaking truth to power" is an effective weapon for the weak. Similarly, the phrase "speaking law to

power" reflects the belief held by some lawyers that the law can be a weapon of the weak who seek to
limit abuses of power. Id. at 103.
17.

Id. at 70.
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entrenched ideology of rights and a relatively independent judiciary are important
factors facilitating cause lawyering, but they, in turn, have developed in part because
of the opportunities to challenge state authority created by federalism, separation of
powers, and institutional support for professional autonomy." Abel examined
societies that ranged from authoritarian to newly emerging democracies and corrupt
dictatorships. He found that "speaking law to power" also occurs in the absence of
significant support for liberal legalism in societies where law and legal process
generally lack either moral legitimacy or the support of independent legal
institutions. 9
The seemingly paradoxical attraction of cause lawyering in such societies has
been accompanied by an astonishing rise in the number of lawyers, and especially in
some of the societies most resistant to democracy and human rights. 2 The mere
presence of a rapidly growing legal profession does not translate into politically
21
independent law, legal institutions, or liberal democracy, at least in the short run.
As Professor William Alford observes in his discussion of the rapidly rising numbers
of lawyers in East Asian societies, there are many new roles for lawyers in rapidly
evolving societies that do not involve confronting state authority. Quite the opposite,
lawyers provide services that augment state control and help government (whatever
its character) manage relationships with international regulation, finance, and
commerce.22 Many forces for change combine to make entry into the legal profession
more attractive. Chief among them is the global economic boom, which has made
lawyers, among other anomalies, the highest paid profession in China. 23 Other
factors that influence the role lawyers play in each society include the international
symbolic significance of constitutionalism 24 and law "as the skeleton of the modern
state";21 pressure from institutions of global finance; and domestic demand in even

18. Id. at 71, 87-95.
19. Id. at 78-102.
20. See William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searchingfor Legal Professionalism in the People's
Republic of China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 287, 290
(William P. Alford ed., 2007) (discussing the rising number of lawyers in China); Daniel S. Lev, A Tale
of Two Legal Professions:Lawyers and State in Malaysia and Indonesia, in RAISING THE BAR, supra, at 383,
387, 400 (discussing the rising numbers of lawyers in Malaysia and Indonesia).
21.

See William P. Alford, Introduction, in RAISING THE BAR, supra note 20, at 1, 7. Scholars debate the
long run, some anticipating convergence, others suggesting that the historical path of the legal profession
in many developing societies will be unique. Id.

22.

See id. at 6-9.

23.

Randall Peerenboom, Assoc. Fellow, Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Socio-Legal Studies, Speech at the Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association (July 2007).

24.

Elizabeth Heger Boyle &John W. Meyer, Modern Law as a Secularized and GlobalMode: Implicationsfor
the Sociology of Law, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION
oF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).

25.

DANIEL

S. LEv,

Introduction, in LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA:

SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 3 (2000).
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the most authoritarian states, however ineffectual, for accountability, transparency,
26
and fairness as social and economic change transform public life.
Thailand's experience exhibits a similarly paradoxical pattern. Since the midtwentieth century, while Thailand's population has tripled, the number of lawyers in
Thailand has increased more than twenty-five fold. In 1960, fewer than 2000
lawyers existed in a population of 23 million; in 2008, there are more than 54,000
private lawyers in a population of 60 million, while thousands more work for the
government as judges, prosecutors, or legal advisors. 27 No doubt Thailand's booming
economy has contributed to the rapidly increasing number of lawyers, raising law
from among the also-rans of university education to one of the most popular fields of
study.2 1 Over roughly the same period, Thailand has experienced nineteen military
coups, the latest in 2006, has had eighteen constitutions, and is still widely criticized
29
for recent human rights violations.
In contrast to earlier periods of global interconnection that were accelerated by
revolutions in transportation (sixteenth through nineteenth centuries) and global
finance (post-World War II), contemporary "third wave" globalization is distinctively
about transnational influence on governance, through exporting institutions,
organization, and technology.3" The current wave of global interconnection has
opened the door as never before to mutual influence. 3 Cultural exports, in the form
of rights, political institutions, or technology of production, have taken shape on the
ground in societies such as Thailand. In turn, developing countries contribute
distinctive views to international discourse on human rights, "Asian values," and rule

26.
27.

See, e.g., Alford, supra note 21, at 9-17 (summarizing the findings of studies of the legal profession in
East Asia included in the volume).
Lawyers at the end of the 1960s are enumerated in NAT'L STATISTICAL OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PRIME
28 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK THAILAND, 1967-1969, at 159 [hereinafter STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK]. For the number of lawyers registered by the Lawyers Council of Thailand as of 2007, see
Lawyers Council of Thailand, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/directory/data/EO7-LawyersCouncil_
ofThailand.pdf.
MINISTER,

28.

(2003)
[hereinafter MOE ANNUAL REPORT]. It is also evidenced by the rapid increase in the number of state
See MINISTRY OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THAILAND

and private law schools. See infra note 97.
29.

See Frank Munger, ConstitutionalReform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen Participationin Thailand,40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455 (2007); David Streckfuss & Mark Templeton, Human Rights and Political
Reform in Thailand,in REFORMING THAI POLITICS 73, 86 (Duncan McCargo ed., 2002).

30. Ammar Siamwalla, Globalisation and Its Governance in HistoricalPerspective, in SOCIAL CHALLENGES
FOR THE MEKONG REGION 13, 34-35 (Mingsan Kaosa-ard et al. eds., 2003). I am calling Siamwalla's
second phase of the Second Globalisation a "third" wave because of its distinctive emphasis on political
and economic governance, rather than finance, but otherwise I accept his characterizations of relevant
changes and their effects.
31.

Lauren Benton has shown that mutual influence is always present even in relations of formally unequal
global influence, such as conquest and colonization. See LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL
CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY 1400-1900 (2002).
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of law. 2 The rule of law and liberal legalism are important exports from the Global
North,33 promoted by dominant world financial and political powers to encourage
stability, but also frequently embraced by domestic advocates who believe that rights
will support equality, accountability, and social welfare within their own societies.34
Widespread advocacy for the rule of law begins with the most powerful
international actors, and it is often prescriptive, suggesting that adoption of Western
models for economic and social regulations, individual rights, and legal process are
key stepping stones to prosperity and democracy. Many of the most important
contemporary advocates for rule of law reforms are powerful international economic
and political actors who promote democracy and the rule of law to stabilize emerging
societies for the benefit of the global economy.35 But advocates with other goals-for
example, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promote human rights,
United Nations agencies, and religious institutions-have also become highly
influential. 6 While international agencies such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. Department of State have promoted rule of law
from the top down-through structural adjustment, diplomatic influence, and
technical expertise resulting in statutory and constitutional reform-more progressive,
humanitarian NGOs and organizations have attempted to influence change at the
grassroots level by linking ideas, technical skills, and financial resources to local
participation in rights advocacy.37
Professors Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink proposed a "spiral model" to
explain a pattern that they perceived created successful movements for enforcement
of international rights regimes through a combination of local advocacy and
32.

See generally ASIAN

DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW

(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) (explaining
Asian conceptions of rule of law and providing an empirical foundation to the debate about "Asian
values").
IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S.

33.

"Global North" is a term used widely to refer to the political, economic, and cultural perspectives of the
economically developed societies, predominantly, but not exclusively, in North America and Europe.
See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Three Metaphorsfor a New Conception of Law: The Frontier,the
Baroque, and the South, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 569, 579 (1995) (exploring the potential significance of the
concept of Global North and Global South).

34.

See id. at 581; Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD:
IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 6-11 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).

35.

See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise inEconomic Development, inTHE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006); Frank Upham, Mythmahing in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE
OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 34, at 75. See generally Gary R. Hess, Waging the Cold War in the Third
World: The Foundationsand the Challenges ofDevelopment, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003).

36.

See MARGARET

E.

KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS

IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 6 (1998); Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 1, at 349;
Jessica T. Mathews, Forewordto PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE,

supra note 34, at vii.
37.

See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 36.
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international pressure.38 According to their theory, partnerships between an
international and a local advocacy group ensure that rights advocacy has validity in
the local "vernacular,"39 while pressure from international advocates, phased in over
the lifetime of a local movement, creates an ascending spiral of influence pressuring
a recalcitrant government toward the implementation of a particular regime of rights.
The key to the "spiral model" is the presence of Transnational Advocacy Networks
(TANS) which link local advocates with their counterparts in International
Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), international agencies, and foreign
countries in a position to deploy a hegemonic discourse of rights in ways the
4
government of the society may be less willing to ignore. 1
Professor Daniel Lev has observed that even in Europe there were "long histories
that produced distinctive local institutions and legal habits."41 Contrary to the views
of American and European scholars who seem to consider an idealized version of
"Western" law a standard by which to judge the evolution of other legal systems, he
maintained that there was nothing natural or universal about the Continental
"rechtsstaat" or the English "rule of law." These systems of legal thought have been
promoted as universal ideals, but they are rationalizations for systems of law that
favored newly emerging political or economic interests. Their adoption by other
societies with different histories is not inevitable and where different dominant
interests promote development. Lev concludes that many new states now face
problems similar to those faced a century or more ago in Europe and that influential
groups have embraced a familiar solution, namely to "establish some controls over
'
powerful governments by subjecting them to more or less autonomous legal process. "42
Nevertheless, he cautions, in new states,
pressures toward constitutionalism and more effective legal process have
advantages and suffer constraints quite different from those of old
Europe .... [I]deas, in Asia as in Europe or anywhere else, take hold only
43
when they make sense domestically and are adapted to domestic purposes.

38.

Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of InternationalHuman Rights Norms into Domestic
Practices:Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE

(Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikknik eds., 1999).

39.

MERRY,

supra note 5,at 1 (describing meaningful characterization of human rights concepts in local
contexts as translation into the "vernacular").

40.

TANs are networks of advocates for particular policies or rights that are "distinguishable largely by the
centrality of principled ideas or values." They offer a variety of resources, such as legitimacy for social
justice claims (and rights) or media and political access for progressive advocacy, as well as material and
technical resources. Social movements may be drawn to TANs and choose lawyers associated with
them. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 36, at 1.

41.

LRV, supra note 25, at 4.

42.

Id.at6.

43.

Id.
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III. WHAT CAUSE LAWYERS DO: A RESEARCH STRATEGY

In their study comparing human rights lawyers in the United States and Latin
America, Dezalay and Garth adopted a promising approach to understanding the
complex means by which law and legal process take hold or fail in developing
societies. The study focused on "microhistories" of lawyers' careers, "and, more
generally, relational biograph[ies]," through which they were able to describe human
rights advocacy in each society as a field "constructed out of the tools and resources
that were available to particular actors at discrete moments." 44 Through analysis of
the collective biographies of elite lawyers, they were able to "situate individuals in
relation to others in fields that are constantly changing."4 Their approach illuminated
the relationship between opportunities for legal action and the institutional structure
underscored by Lev. Tracing careers objectively illustrates, in a way that no
declaration of motives, ideals, or principles could, the evolving opportunities, rewards,
and limits for legal advocacy within Latin American and U.S. political institutions.
Tracing the careers of human rights lawyers in the United States and Latin
America revealed sharp differences in the relationship between law and the "field of
state power."46 Investing in law offered very different career opportunities and
leverage for political change in the two hemispheres. While human rights advocacy
and public interest law practice are widely valorized in the United States-and may
be a springboard to a mainstream legal career, professional status, and influence in
politics and government-investment in similar legal activity in Latin America is
typically a dead end.4 ' There the path to power is through politics, not law. Because
law lacks independent institutional support, human rights and public interest law
practice earns little respect and accumulates far less professional capital in Latin
America.
Dezalay and Garth's research on lawyers' careers has important implications for
better understanding the globalization of legal expertise and the success of rightsbased advocacy. 48 The resources contributed by global networks of advocacy, foreign
44. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 355. The authors' conceptualization of a career employed throughout
their work is derived from the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who describes the factors
which contribute to construction of a field of action. A "field" is conceived as a "patterned system of
objective forces" that "prescribes its particular values and possesses its own regulative principles" which
governs the probability of rewards or sanctions. PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic J. D. WACQUANT, AN
INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 17-18 (1992).
45.

Dezalay & Garth, supranote 9, at 355.

46.

Id. The "field of state power" is a field in which actors attempt to exercise power over or on behalf of
the state.

47.

See id. at 356-58.

48.

Over the past thirty years, networks of advocates for human rights and other rights-based causes have
grown in number, resources, and influence. See id. at 354. Latin American human rights lawyers,
Dezalay and Garth argue, have been sustained almost entirely by funding from U.S. philanthropies and
legitimacy derived from international affiliations. See id. at 361-63. The authors describe the growth
of Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) as organizations driven in large part
by their dissenting stance within U.S. domestic politics and their evolving strategies for influencing
American political opinion, as well as world opinion. See id. at 360-62, 364-65. The Ford Foundation,
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aid, or international organizations supporting human rights had far from the expected
long term effects. Where the structural determinants of legal careers were quite
different in Latin America from the United States, career narratives revealed different
potentials and limits for law. Further, Dezalay and Garth advise scholars who are
"promoters of transnational cause lawyering to investigate critically the norms that
gain legitimacy, funding and media attention in the places that count." The place
that counts most is often Washington, D.C., where United States' foreign policy
shapes the goals of many international networks whose apparent disagreements with
foreign policy often merely fine tune the same overall approach to transplantation of
familiar legal institutions to developing societies.49

Lawyers' careers, therefore, have provided a promising starting point for
examining both the evolving role of law and the influence of global advocacy for
rights in developing societies; but to achieve a better understanding, the research
must go well beyond the boundaries of Professors Dezalay and Garth's research.
While they helpfully draw attention to the "system of objective forces" influencing
career decisions, they have, for comparative purposes, greatly simplified their account
of the forces at work in shaping lawyers' careers by explaining differences largely in
terms of the overall strength or weakness of the profession and, in turn, the legal
system's overall political dependence or independence. This oversimplification
ignores local variation in the influence of law, which may be important, for example,
to the relative importance of law in regulating different institutional sectors or in
mediating different types of relationships between individuals and government."
While law may lack power with respect to some traditional institutions and some
types of social relationships, it may have much greater power with respect to others.
Thus, Dezalay and Garth may have drawn broad conclusions reflecting only the
views of an inner circle of state power in countries where the legitimacy of law is
weak at the highest levels but not uniform or static throughout the society.
Theory and empirical research suggest the "forces" that draw cause lawyers into
careers and influence deployment of their expertise include the structure of work

and later Al and HRW, focused on funding human rights organizations in Latin America in opposition
to the then official American foreign policy to support Latin American dictators. See id. at 362. But
the support for human rights and rule of law by Americans through legal education of Latin American
lawyers at U.S. law schools, links between American or international human rights specialists and their
Latin American counterparts, and funding for human rights litigation in Latin America, failed to
transform the field of human rights advocacy in Latin America. See id. at 369. In Chile, for example,
politically well-connected but out-of-power elites, who also happened to be lawyers, joined the
American-funded effort to promote human rights. See id. at 359. When regime change occurred, these
elites reentered conventional politics, abandoned their legal careers, and the human rights movement in
Chile collapsed. See id. at 368-69; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 8, at 55-56.
49.
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settings;5' types of clients; 2 relationships that are formed in professional or "epistemic"
communities (groups sharing common views about causes of and solutions to social
problems); 3 opportunities to use law in combination with other forms of political,
moral, and symbolic power; 4 and global resources available through networks,
conferences, education, travel, funding, and other relationships." Contexts that
seem to make cause lawyering risky to observers may nevertheless offer attractive
possibilities for a career in law when viewed in the vernacular. 6 Even where courts,
the profession, and law are weak, lawyers may mobilize a variety of resources,
including symbolic and political resources, religious institutions and values, or other
cultural systems and networks of support, either within the state itself or outside the
society. They may deploy collective action that circumvents the legal system or
strategically exploit limitations of the legal system. Thus, the seemingly limited
overall prospects for law in opposing the state may not tell the whole story of the
production of legal advocacy.
In sum, neither the view that associates cause lawyering with liberal legalism nor
the view that identifies cause lawyering with the dangers of "speaking law to power"
from a position of opposition to the state captures all the ways that Thai lawyers may
pursue a moral vision of society. The lawyers that were interviewed for this study
collectively pursued careers spanning more than half a century and virtually every
significant social movement in Thailand. Their careers have not all been cut from
the same cloth or shaped by shared purposes. Yet all have been influenced by the
legal culture formed during Thailand's unique, non-colonial path toward development:
first as a modernizing monarchy, then as an evolving "bureaucratic polity" in which
all leading political factions had power within the state administration, 7 and, most
recently, as a society struggling to establish democratic political institutions. It is to
the narratives of the careers of four Thai social justice lawyers that we turn next in
51.

See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, andLabor: The UnitedFarm Workers' Legal Strategy in the 1960s
and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union OrganizingToday, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 13-17, 46-50

(2005).
52.

See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.

53.

See Stephen Meili, Latin American Cause-LawyeringNetworks, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE
IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 3, at 307, 311.

54. Scholars in the United States are discovering that lawyers for social movements often support a savvy
mixture of legal and non-legal strategies determined by political opportunities and collective decision
making.

See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's A//urements". A Relational

Analysis ofSocialMovement Lawyers in the UnitedStates,in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 1, at 261, 276 (using the term "new style" public
interest litigation as suggested in
OF

55.

DISABLED PERSONS

SUSAN M.

OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS

(1984)).

See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 36.

56. See supra note 39.
57. See Kevin Hewison, Introduction: Power, Oppositions, and Democratization, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN
THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 1, 3-5 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997).
Thailand's
bureaucratic polity concentrated power in Bangkok and incorporated all powerful elite groups, including
the rising Sino-Thai commercial families who were not part of the hereditary aristocracy. See id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 531I2008/09

order to understand the forces that have shaped their work and their ability to
influence the exercise of government power.
IV. FOUR GENERATIONS OF THAI SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERS

In this Part we will meet four Thai cause lawyers and learn about their careers,
beginning not only with their earliest thoughts about law but also a description of
the decisions, actions, and experiences that have carried them to the present. The
lawyers' lifetimes span Thai history from the 1920s, when the oldest was born under
58
the absolute monarchy, to the present, under Thailand's eighteenth constitution.
The oldest entered the practice of law in 1951, under a military dictator, and the
youngest in 1999, in a democracy just two years after the ratification of Thailand's
most liberal constitution, the so-called "People's Constitution." Changes which
occurred over this eighty-year period, in the structure and institutions of government,
economy, and society, interweave the stories of the lawyers. Their narratives, while
representative of their contemporaries in no strict sense, have been chosen to illustrate
the effects of these changes during four broad time periods which I call "generations."
The time periods I use to define a generation have been determined by the changes
that seemed most significant to the lawyers themselves, rather than by wholly
arbitrary criteria such as evenly spaced cohorts. Seminal political and social events
led to experiences which define particular generations in Thai culture (much like
World War II or the "60s" define generations in the United States) and which
radically changed the opportunities for deploying law within the society. The four
generations are thus a convenience used to compress the more complex and complete
story of law and institutional development that lies at the core of this research.
In subsection A, I introduce each narrator and sketch Thailand's legal history.
This serves two purposes: to justify the generational markers I use to contextualize
each career and to provide essential institutional and political history for the reader.
In subsections B through E, I tell a more complete story about each of the lawyers
and fill in additional historical details.
The four narratives intersect at important points. While several of the lawyers
know each other, none knows all of the others. Yet an important theme is that these
careers have been influenced not only by historical context but by the actions of
earlier generations that have shaped the field of social justice law practice. Thus, the
narratives are presented in order, tracing both history and the cumulative effects of
earlier generations.
Unlike the studies of human rights lawyers' careers conducted by Dezalay and
Garth, I am not concerned here with an elite group aspiring to become members of
an inner circle in the "field of state power." These Thai lawyers had little expectation
of high status and were motivated in part by the much more prosaic goal of finding
a career. They found ways to sustain careers validated by some measure of self58. See generally Wikipedia: Constitution of Thailand, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution of_
Thailand (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) (providing a well-researched and referenced overview of Thai
constitutional history).
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respect and effectiveness. Yet like the careers of the potential power elite, careers of
typical social justice lawyers also provide a window into law's legitimacy, independence,
and power.
Previous research provides little guidance for predictions about how social justice
law practices may emerge or not emerge, succeed or fail, in rapidly developing new
states, as a means to limit the power of government. The inductive approach adopted
in this article attempts to sketch two interrelated stories. The first is a story about
the process that draws individuals into a difficult line of work and into a profession
unknown prior to the late nineteenth century (and unknown to most well into the
twentieth century) in the hope of influencing government and social change. The
second story is about the consequences of this decision, not only for the lawyers
themselves but for the profession, and potentially, the "field of state power." The
contributions of the individual narrators, however small, must be viewed as part of a
broader process, and I will point out, in a speculative concluding section, where I
think their contributions are reflective of trends in the broader process.
A. The Historical Context ofFour Generationsof Thai SocialJusticeLawyers
Until the nineteenth century, governance in the feudal society of Siam, later
renamed Thailand, was adapted to the needs of a powerful monarch and his local
subordinates who exercised traditional authority. The structure and substance of
monarchical rule spread from other parts of South and Southeast Asia, but, unlike
the remote, infallible, and semi-divine rulers of India and Cambodia, Siam's
monarchs embraced a version of Buddhism that obligated them, as well as their
people, to obey its precepts.5 9 Buddhism, still the religion of more than ninety
percent of Thailand's people, 60 teaches that karma-the accumulated merit of an
individual-determines individual fate. 61 The concept of karma underpinned
Thailand's traditional social hierarchy.62 In the sixteenth century, hierarchy was
formalized by the system of sakdina, in which each member of society, from members
of the royal family to the lowliest villager, had a prescribed place based on their
relationship to the king.63 While sakdina became a relic after the overthrow of the
absolute monarchy in 1932, modern Thai society remains hierarchical. 64 Its monarch
is still revered for his virtue and, many Thai believe, his sacred power. The influence
of Buddhism remains strong, but has fragmented in an era of mass society,
59.
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consumerism, and middle class ambition.6" Still, although much has changed, the
institution of the monarchy and the hierarchy it represents still survive and their
66
influence in both social relationships and politics is apparent.
In the pre-constitutional era before 1932, King Chulalongkorn's (1853-1910) late
nineteenth century "defensive modernization" of the Thai state included gradual
Westernization of its legal institutions: establishment of courts, adoption of civil and
criminal codes, and bureaucratic administration.67 State administration remained, as
before, highly centralized, answerable to the king, and remote from the vast majority
of ordinary Thai, although the aristocracy was pushed to assume administrative roles
replacing their hereditary authority. The legal system King Chulalongkorn
established was influenced by both civil and common law institutions, although the
prevalence of code law, absence of citizen participation, and limited authority for
judicial review suggest the predominance of civil law.68 Since the early twentieth
century, Thailand has had civil and criminal courts of general jurisdiction and, more
recently, specialized courts for domestic, labor, and commercial and intellectual
6
property cases. 1
From its establishment, the purpose of the legal system was to support the
centralization of the king's authority, and the need for lawyers was limited largely to
the affairs of state or dealings with foreign governments. King Chulalongkorn sent
his son, Prince Rajburidirekrit (known as Prince Rabi), to study law in England, and
on his return Prince Rabi established the first law school, which was for sons of royal
families who were expected, like other members of the aristocracy, to serve in the
king's government.70 Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, private domestic
business and commerce were undeveloped and dominated by Sino-Thai merchant
families.71 The largely rural population knew little about law or lawyers.
A few firms with foreign-trained lawyers were located in Bangkok to serve
foreign business interests, but the number of lawyers in private practice was small.72
As the influence of Western culture grew, families with means increasingly sent
65.
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their sons abroad to be educated, typically to France or England. Some, who were
sons (and later daughters) of royalty, the tiny middle class, or successful Sino-Thai
merchant families, returned with an education in law. Thai who were educated
abroad, and especially those with law degrees, were likely to serve in the government
after returning to Thailand. Alternatives to entering government service were few.
Prestige and position were not won by entering private practice. A law graduate with
an aristocratic name might become an important bureaucrat or win a coveted position
in the Foreign Service."
The monarchy's historical compromise with Western power opened Thai legal
culture to the influence of powerful new values, including the concepts of equality
and human rights.7 4 These new values, along with other elements of European
culture, were embraced by some elites, but the attraction was by no means universal.
Nevertheless, a slow transformation began which contributed to overthrow of the
absolute monarchy by elites educated in the West, including a group of military
leaders, and creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1932."s
Pridi Banomyong, the intellectual force behind the elite revolution that overthrew
the absolute monarchy in 1932, made establishment of a public university to educate
government officials one of his first priorities. In 1933, the University of Moral and
Political Science (later renamed Thammasat University) opened, offering an
undergraduate curriculum in law and other subjects, intended to educate future
government officials in their responsibilities to the nation and its people. Pridi,
imbued with many Western values, expected the majority of graduates to enter public
service and to help establish a new mission for government-being responsive to the
needs of the people-but his attempt to establish a parliamentary democracy was
short-lived.76 Generals who made up the majority of the revolutionary party had
ambitions of their own and soon pushed Pridi aside, promoting a new nationalism
that combined the authority of the monarchy, the symbolic unity of the nation, and
the sacred power of Buddhism under a central administration closely connected to its
77
powerful leaders. From 1947-1973, Thailand was ruled by military dictators.
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In this period of military dictatorship, Thailand's government formed a
bureaucratic polity.78 While diverse elite factions were incorporated, and politics
were pursued within the bureaucratic state, the bulk of the population was excluded
from meaningful political participation. Moreover, there were few effective legal
checks on the exercise of power by the Thai bureaucracy. The Thai Parliament
tended to delegate broadly to ministries which used their authority to make policies
without effective parliamentary oversight. The courts were deferential to bureaucratic
discretion in making policy. With little oversight, Thai ministries were vulnerable
to the self-interest of bureaucrats and outside influence, qualities that allowed
alliances of the powerful traditional elite, military, and wealthy business families to
grow through favoritism and corruption.79
Thongbai Thongbao, perhaps Thailand's first social justice lawyer, began his
career in the era of Thailand's bureaucratic polity. He graduated in 1951 from
Thammasat University's Faculty of Law, Thailand's first law school for commoners.
It is not difficult to understand how Thongbai's origins in poverty, exposure to
teachers steeped in public service, and belief in Buddhism contributed to an early
embrace of social justice. Buddhism, together with Thammasat University's public
service values, emerges from Thongbai's narrative as an important source of guiding
principles. His identity as a lawyer, and the dictators' abuse of both the concept of
public service and the virtues of the dhama ruler to whom they owed allegiance,
explain his passion for justice. More extraordinary is his early decision to devote his
life to the legal defense of victims of government abuse at a time when there were
few lawyers in Thailand and hardly any willing to oppose a ruthless military
dictatorship.
The second generation of social justice lawyers entered the legal profession under
radically different circumstances. The critical turning point for them occurred in
1973, although social unrest leading to the events of that year began long before.8"
The student uprising against the dictatorship in 1973 and its aftermath marked a
watershed in cause lawyering and in Thai anti-authoritarianism generally. Not only
was the rising tide of discontent and radical idealism among students validated,
shaping the careers of many, but Pridi's public service ideals for legal education were
reinforced and reshaped, especially at Thammasat, to emphasize the transformation
of civil society as well as government. For later generations, Thammasat became the
most desirable law school for candidates with a commitment to social causes and the
source of a disproportionate number of new cause lawyers.8
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Equality and democracy have particular appeal for the generation of Thai who
lived through the 1960s era of brutal military rule and anti-communist terrorism
that led to the student uprising of October 14, 1973, the "October Revolution." In
the 1960s, Thailand's economy experienced its first "take-off." The military
dictatorship received massive American foreign aid and philanthropy as well as
World Bank guidance8 2 During the Vietnam War, Thailand became a staging area
for U.S. military intervention in Vietnam as well as efforts to create a free market
bulwark in Thailand against the spread of communism. Many members of Thailand's
growing educated elite opposed the Thai government's authoritarianism and
corruption and supported the October student uprising." The uprising toppled the
U.S.-supported military government and created a brief window for political
liberalization. The years 1973-1976 became a watershed of social and political
84
change-a true "constitutional moment."
Military rule returned in 1976 after a second bloody confrontation between the
military and students because, in part, a wavering middle class favored stability, even
if it meant the return of an authoritarian government. The political ambivalence of
the Thai urban middle class toward popular democracy, and its comfort with
authoritarian governments under some circumstances, is a continuing theme of Thai
politics." Government persecution of the October activists drove many of them to
join the communists in the countryside. By the end of the 1970s, a more moderate
authoritarian regime attempted to heal this rift by welcoming the dissidents back
into Thai society. 6 Many members of the "October generation" continue in active
roles in universities, government, and private enterprise.
Among the most influential members of the October generation is Somchai
Homla-or, a second generation social justice lawyer who came of age as a student
leader at Thammasat University before and during the uprising. Like other students
of his generation, when the uprising toppled the dictatorship and democracy followed,
he became a teacher and organizer in the countryside. When the dictators returned,
he fled to the jungle to seek protection. Somchai returned from the jungle in 1979
significant for purposes of my research, virtually all cause lawyers from Thailand's Muslim south
attended this law school.
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to a greatly altered political landscape. During the 1980s, under stable, military-led
governments, the economy again grew rapidly, attracting Japanese and Western
investors. The October generation's legacy grew through the efforts of returning
activists, like Somchai Homla-or, who helped build a vibrant NGO movement in
both the poorer parts of the countryside and in urban centers.
A third generation of social justice lawyers graduated in the shadow of the events
of 1973 with the new political and social landscape of the 1980s-relatively benign
military leaders and a booming economy. With the end of the Cold War, communism
receded as a plausible threat. Political space opened as government violence against
its enemies declined.87 Many lawyers strove to expand this space, but they were by
no means the only actors who entered this field of opportunity. Unlike Latin
America, Thailand was never the focus of a decades-long Cold War campaign by
U.S. philanthropists for rule of law or human rights reform. Yet the long-term
presence of NGO workers and organizers in rural areas indirectly reflects the
influence of global funding and activism. Some TANs became facilitators of political
consciousness and organizers of social movements among the rural poor.8" The
continuing presence of NGO workers, with some support from TANs and
international aid agencies, may have strengthened popular consciousness of social
injustice but may not necessarily have raised consciousness of rights, in part because
of the influence of traditional culture in the construction of popular justice claims in
local contexts.8 9 Thai have always been ambivalent about perceived foreign
intervention, and as a result, not only was the American and Vietnamese intervention
increasingly unpopular, but the NGO movement was (and is still) widely perceived
as foreign-supported and, therefore, "non-Thai."
Surachi Trong-ngam is a third generation social justice lawyer who graduated
from Thammasat's law program in 1987. Early in his career he worked for NGOs
while he accumulated experience. In 1994 he and three other lawyers formed a
private social justice law practice. In 2000, with the aid of a network of activists and
foreign funding, he became coordinator of an environmental litigation project. Many
third generation lawyers, representing a transitional cohort of social justice lawyers,
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with poor communities in the 1980s and 1990s.
89.

See MISSINGHAM, supra note 88, at 215-20; Frank E. Reynolds, Legitimation and Rebellion: Thailand's
Civic Religion and the Student Uprisingof October, 1973, in RELIGION AND LEGITIMATION OF POWER IN
THAILAND, LAOS, AND BURMA

134 (Bardwell L. Smith ed., 1978).
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combine the idealism of the October generation with new career opportunities in a
growing private sector.
A military coup in 1991 provoked yet another confrontation, this time with a
much stronger, widely mobilized "civil society" sector, which resulted in the
restoration of civilian rule and a strong rejection of military intervention.9" The
same sector led a popular debate about expansion of constitutional rights and
democratic government. In its final stages, the efforts of these advocates for change,
combined with institutional failures contributing to the currency crisis of 19971 and
international pressure for "structural reform," 92 led to adoption, with widespread
popular approval, of a liberal, rights-oriented constitution in 1997.9'
Until 1997, Thailand's constitutions played only a small role in its jurisprudence;
courts rarely referred to the constitution and only a handful of cases involving
constitutional questions were decided against the government.94 The 1997 Thai
Constitution, however, created a politically independent Constitutional Court with
power to render binding constitutional interpretations and an Administrative Court
that for the first time offered an accessible forum for challenging the decisions and
policies of the vast bureaucracy.
The fourth generation is comprised of lawyers whose careers began after the
adoption of the 1997 Constitution. During this generation, the NGO movement
has continued to strengthen and expand in part a result of new forms of foreign
subsidy. After the Cold War ended, the United States was far less interested in
sending military aid to Southeast Asia, but aid has continued and reflects, as always,
American social concerns and policies, including drug interdiction and human
trafficking prevention.
Duean Wongsa is a fourth generation social justice lawyer. She graduated in
1999 with a law degree from Chiangmai University and followed the tide of law
graduates entering the global economy, choosing employment for two years as a
lawyer with a Japanese business firm. At present, she is a staff lawyer with a
trafficking prevention NGO funded by the U.S. government but created by a long-

90. See BENEDICT

ANDERSON,

Elections in SoutheastAsia,in THE SPECTRE OF COMPARISONS: NATIONALISM,
supra note 85, at 272; BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at

SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE WORLD,

243-46.
91.

The IMF interventions in 1997, together with foreign criticisms of "crony-capitalism" and "patronclientelism," were considered Eurocentric misperceptions by many Thai. See BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT,

supra note 4, at 256-57.
92.

See id. at 254. See generally PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND'S CRISIS (2000)
(discussing the role of the IMF and more broadly discussing what worked and failed from both an
economic and social perspective).

93.

See Michael Kelly Conners, Framingthe 'People'sConstitution,' in REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra note

29, at 37.
94.

See Imaizumi, supra note 69, at 229-37.
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time Thai-British organizer and philanthropist. Her career reflects the maturation,
in a certain sense, of social justice lawyering as a viable career.
After ten years of popular democratic rule, a military coup in September 2006

imposed a government pattern that many Thai thought had been rejected in 1992.
Yet the coup was bloodless and was welcomed by middle class, urban Thai because it
ousted a prime minister who, although popularly elected, was perceived as corrupt
and overreaching. The coup leaders restored civilian rule under a new, popularlyratified constitution after a little more than a year, but many Thai have viewed the
recent coup as a step back from constitutionalism and rights.
Thailand's rapidly growing economy has created opportunities for lawyers and,

perhaps, for cause lawyers. Access to university level education has increased steadily
since the mid-twentieth century, supplying both the private sector and the government

with educated workers.96 Law is an increasingly popular undergraduate major,97 and
the number of licensed attorneys is growing rapidly.93 In 1985, Parliament established
an independent Lawyers Council of Thailand with exclusive power to license

96.

See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 149-52; ROBERT J. MUSCAT, THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES:
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND FOREIGN AID

49-70 (1990).

97. As in Great Britain and much of Europe, Thai law schools are four-year undergraduate institutions.
The first public law school, which later expanded to become Thammasat University, was established in
1933 as an "open" university, introducing a radically democratic concept of education, especially
professional education, in a country where universities had been administered by and largely for the
benefit of its elite. In most of rural Thailand, primary education was provided to males only, typically
by literate monks at nearby temples. Secondary education was neither free nor locally available in much
of the country. In the 1960s, a faculty of law was added to Chulalongkorn University, the country's
oldest university. See KOvILAIKOOL, supra note 70, at 538. In the late 1970s, Thailand's first openadmission law school, Ramkamhaeng, was founded. Id. Over the past twenty years, the number of
public law schools has increased rapidly. The Ministry of Education (MOE) records statistics for
twenty-four public universities and other institutions of higher education offering first law degrees
(undergraduate degrees). See MOE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 27. A web search suggested that
an equal number of private schools may offer first law degrees. While graduates in Law are not
uniformly reported separately from graduates in Political Science in the MOE's reports, the numbers
suggest an enormous rise in popularity of law among undergraduates beginning in the 1980s. During
Thailand's boom in the 1980s, law became the second most popular field of study. Chira Hongladarom,
Unemployment in Thailand, in THAILAND ON THE MOVE: STUMBLING BLOCKS AND BREAKTHROUGHS
(Suchart Prasithrathsint ed., 1990). The table is reproduced in Tienchai Wongschisuwan, The Political
Economy of Thailand: The Thai Peripheral State, 1958-1988, at 378 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, SUNY Binghamton) (on file with author).
98. The careers of practicing lawyers, public prosecutors, and judges are distinct. The term for a practicing
lawyer is frequently translated as "barrister," although unlike the British use of this term, it covers all
licensed lawyers, including those who perform functions as solicitors as well as those who appear in
court. As in many civil law legal systems, candidates seeking to become public prosecutors or judges
must pass a separate, much more difficult examination, and usually sit for this exam early in their
careers. Thus, judges and prosecutors do not normally come from the ranks of practitioners. Most
judges are career bureaucrats receiving assignments which are, as a formal matter, based on merit and
moving up a hierarchy of authority and desirability (e.g., being assigned to an area closer to Bangkok is
generally considered more desirable). As described previously, the number of practitioners has increased
dramatically in the past twenty-five years, paralleling the rise in other rapidly developing Asian societies.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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attorneys.99 The Lawyers Council of Thailand has utilized its mandate to establish
a legal assistance bureau to provide a clearinghouse for lawyers representing
individuals and movements in human rights cases, although the scope and effect of
this role awaits careful study. The governing board of the Lawyers Council has
included human rights lawyers like Somchai Homla-or, who became the first
chairman of its Human Rights Committee after the adoption of the 1997
Constitution. Surachai has served on both its Environmental Law and Human
Rights Committees.
Yet the maturation of social justice law careers does not reflect the complexities
that Thai social justice lawyers confront. For example, in spite of explicit recognition
of human rights by the 1997 Constitution, and the growing support for human rights
lawyers from the Lawyers Council of Thailand, an attorney associated with the
Council, widely known for his human rights advocacy on behalf of the Muslim
minority in southern Thailand, was assassinated by police in 2004. The Lawyers
Council responded by issuing a public declaration calling for an investigation into
and the punishment of the perpetrators, yet the government has taken no action to
identify or prosecute his abductors.'
The assassination is not an isolated case, and
the government's use of violence to silence advocacy for rights, however infrequent,
cannot be ignored by Thai attorneys.
Authoritarian rule has roots in Thai legal culture. Professor Frank Reynolds
contrasts fundamental values underlying the political discourse of constitutional
monarchy in Thailand-often described in terms of a trilogy of concepts: monarchy,
nation, and religion-with the underlying values that dominate American political
culture, termed "utilitarian individualism." 10' While American political culture grew
from a tradition of individual freedom of conscience and dissent, treating
institutionalized authority with suspicion, Thai political culture grew from a tradition
far more respectful of the authority of traditional and spiritual leaders. Yet, the
culture of deference to traditional leaders has not precluded objections to government
99.

A Thai Bar Association has existed since the reign of Rama VI (1910-1925), but, in the views of
practitioners, it came to be dominated by Thailand's career judges and prosecutors. Its current
responsibilities are principally educational: preparing applicants who sit for the examinations for these
positions. KOVILAIKOOL, supra note 70, at 539; Malee Pruekpongsawalee, Thammasat ClinicalEducation
and the Delivery of Legal Services: A Historicaland PersonalPerspective, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE
AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE, AND THE COMMUNITY 118, 124-27
(Louise G. Trubek &Jeremy Cooper eds., 1999). Practitioners pushed steadily for their own professional
association as private sector growth increased their numbers and economic independence.

In 1985,

Parliament established the separate Lawyers Council of Thailand to oversee and speak for practicing
lawyers. KOVILAIKOOL, supra note 70, at 546-47. Since 1985, graduates with a law degree qualify for
the practice of law by attending a course of classroom preparation for law practice provided by the
Lawyers Council followed by a six month apprenticeship. However, graduates who have already
accumulated more than a year of apprenticeship experience or who have served as public prosecutors or

judges are exempt from these requirements. Id.
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See WORKING GROUP ON JUSTICE FOR PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK: OVERVIEW OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

10-11 (2008), availableat http://thailand.ahrchk.
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101. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 433; see also Aphornsuvan, supra note 61, at 277-78, 286.
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action based on the welfare of the Thai people, and advocates for popular movements
have been able to claim that those in power are responsible for promoting the people's
welfare. 10 2 Equality and democracy (if not precisely representativedemocracy)".3 also

have a strong appeal, not only among elites, but among the Thai people generally,
and growing support for these values is credited, in part, for the strong popular
protests which toppled military rule in 1992 l04 and propelled constitutional reform in
1997.10'
Some Western scholars have suggested that Thai culture encourages respect for
leaders, avoidance of direct conflict, and reluctance to invoke law against persons
who possess authority. 106 According to this theory, patriarchal social norms encourage
clientelism and networking to secure social position and benefits rather than
contentious interaction with government officials and private power holders. If such
a generalization is true, one might argue that Thai cause lawyers will prefer mediation
or cooperation with the government over threatening to invoke formal legal process
in order to preempt or oppose the government or other power holders. This
generalization, like the claim that the Thai embrace "Buddhist values," is controversial
and best evaluated in the context of particular conflicts and the work of particular
cause lawyers.
B. Thongbai Thongbao-The People's Lawyer
Thongbai Thongbao, a first generation cause lawyer, was born in 1926 to a family
of poor rice farmers in Ubon Rachiatari (Thailand's poorest region located in the
northeast) and raised by his five siblings. During his long career, he has become
Thailand's best known human rights lawyer. He looks back to humble origins to
explain his mission to fight on behalf of the poor and oppressed. Thongbai knew
little about law and had never met a lawyer, but he was encouraged to choose law by
a young law graduate from Thammasat who taught in his high school and put into
practice the public service values he had learned at the university. The young teacher
102. See Jackson, supra note 65; Reynolds, supra note 59.
103. See MICHAEL KELLY CONNORS, DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THAILAND, at ch. 8 (2003)
(claiming democracy and liberal western political values are often embraced as an ideal and taken to
mean government which respects the needs and best interests of the people-government for the
people). But this rhetoric and its underlying values are manipulated to support authoritarian
governance-government for the people but not by the people, rather government by the better elements
of society.
104. ANDERSON. Elections in SoutheastAsia. in THE SPECTRE OF COMPARISONS: NATIONALISM
ASIA, AND THE WORLD, supra note 85, at 265, 271-72 & n.8.

,

SOUTHEAST

105. See Imaizumi, supra note 69, at 228.
106. See, e.g., FIONA HAINES, GLOBALIZATION AND REGULATORY CHARACTER: REGULATORY REFORM
AFTER THE KADER TOY FACTORY FIRE 52-56 (2005). Haines' theory does not predict an absence of
conflict, but rather suggests that Thai power holders also prefer "corporatist" consolidation of their
power and exclusion of rivals rather than public conflict or violence. Id. at 55. Yet Thai society displays
plenty of overt conflict. As Indonesia scholar Daniel Lev commented with respect to another Asian
culture said to avoid conflict, "[i]f Indonesians seek harmony and avoid conflict, they have not been
good at it." LEv, supra note 25, at 5-6.
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told him, "Even poor people like you can study in Bangkok. You can work to put
yourself through school." With some help from his family, and by working and
living like a pauper, Thongbai graduated from Thammasat in 1951 with a degree in
law.
The Northeast is very poor and exploited by many people ....
[W]ith my
own eye, I have seen they have taken people's real estate, something like that.
So I think if I study law I think I can do something good for the people .... I
thought if I am a lawyer I can fight the police; I can fight many people.
Because to be a lawyer, as a people's lawyer I can fight them.
Thongbai did not learn how to help poor people in law school, and he could not
become a lawyer until he had served as an apprentice to a licensed lawyer. When he
found an apprenticeship there was nothing for him to do, and he earned no money.
He was forced to live in a Buddhist temple, which charged nothing. He worked as a
reporter to support himself. Journalism, he said, was a good way to criticize the
government and earn a living at the same time.
Work as a reporter led to his first arrest, not for his reporting, but because one of
his friends was arrested under the anti-communist law for joining a peace movement.
Thongbai had not participated in the peace movement and was released after three
days. He then attempted to defend his friend in court but failed miserably, he says,
and his friend was given a long jail term.
For the next seven years he worked primarily as a reporter. In 1958, Thongbai
joined a group of journalists touring China. During his absence from Thailand, a
coup brought to power a brutal and virulently anti-communist general. Thongbai
was arrested when he returned from China, and spent the next eight years in jail
fighting his own case and those of other prisoners." 7
I enjoyed being in jail ....

[A]s a political prisoner I could go on practicing

law. I had applied for my license-I had it in 1958. In jail I was teaching law
to the prisoners. They are farmers. Even if they graduated from university
they knew nothing about the law.
Thongbai not only defended his fellow prisoners in court, he organized them to
fight to improve the prison's abominable conditions by appealing to families for
support, convincing prison officials to allow the prisoners to cultivate prison grounds
so they could grow food and supplement their inadequate diet, organizing recreational
activities, and forming a legal defense committee with seven other imprisoned
lawyers.108

107. He won his case before a military court in 1966, but only after the death of the dictator and a public
discrediting of his regime. 1984 Ramon Magasaysay Award For Public Service: Biography of Thongbai
Thongpao, http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/BiographyThongpaoTho.htm, (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Thongbai Biography].
108. See id. In 1975, two years after a student-led uprising toppled the dictatorship, he published a
best-selling account written during his Lad Praow prison years entitled LadPraow Communists. Id.; see
also REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 36.
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In 1960, while in jail, he filed a suit on behalf of all of the prisoners for false
arrest under Thai law and also under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Three years later a civilian court ruled in the prisoners' favor under Thai law. All of
the prisoners were released except Thongbai and two others who were charged with
new offenses under the Anti-communist Act and brought before a military tribunal.
Thongbai again brought a false arrest claim, initiating a four-year stalemate. When
an acquittal seemed likely, following a regime change, the government offered to
drop all charges against him and many similarly situated inmates if, in return, he
dropped his suit for false arrest. If his freedom alone had been at stake, Thongbai
would have continued the legal fight, but he could not refuse an offer which would
benefit so many others.
Thongbai entered prison as a journalist and part-time lawyer, but he left with a
mission to practice human rights law and with a reputation that brought him political,
labor, and human rights cases. Over the next thirty years, many of the most
celebrated cases involving political prisoners, social movement leaders, and outspoken
critics of government found their way to him, enhancing his reputation.
Eventually he set up a small office in a poor section of Thon Buri (across the
Chao Phraya River from Bangkok). He invited younger lawyers to join him as
volunteer apprentices, and eventually the number grew to about twenty. He has
worked with many contemporaries and younger lawyers, but few could sustain his
level of commitment to practicing on behalf of the poor who often could pay very
little for their services.
You should know that the Thai people are very kind people. They give me
some money .... But the people who have no money... when they come to
see me they bring durian, when they come from the Northeast they come
with a bag of rice or carrots .... So, I am happy. Maybe only in Thailand
you can do that. . . to live like that ... because they are Buddhist. They tell
me "Thongbai if you practice law in the United States you will become a
millionaire." But I did not want to do that. No lawyer practices like me at
the time, or now. I think, how can I live like that? But I can live very easy at
that time. We have rice to eat. We have everything. If you could see my
house, it is a small room. One hundred fifty baht per month-five dollars at
that time. Because I know nothing about the safety of the lawyer at that
time.
Even in recent times, some Thai lawyers representing movements which officials
deem threatening have been arrested, attacked, and even assassinated. But Thongbai
has never been concerned about his safety as a defender of political prisoners.
I feel I did good things. People don't want to kill me. Even after all that, the
military and the police were not against me. Because they recognize I do
good things. I am for justice. Even after October 1976, people leave for the
jungle. But I stay [in Bangkok] all the time. And I fight for the communists.
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I fight for the reporters [charged with] lse-majestM. ° I fight for the farmer
and I fight for the communist.
Thongbai has at times stood carefully apart from politics. He did not join supporters
of the student uprising in 1973, although he supported the opening for democracy in
principle. "I did not join the uprising. So that is why I can stay [out of the jungle].
What can I do? That is why the police and high ranking military officer trust
me ....

I am free."

He led a team of lawyers who defended students that were arrested and charged
with crimes during the reimposition of military rule in 1976, negotiating a spectacular
retreat by the government. Having brought the case to near-victory, he forced the
prime minister to refer the prisoners' fate to the Parliament which granted a broad
amnesty to all who had fled to the jungles to avoid arrest and prosecution after
1976.11'
After the October activists returned from the jungle, some were charged with
offenses under the Anti-communist Act for their subsequent activities. Thongbai
now had many cases in military court where he enjoyed practicing because the rules
of evidence were more relaxed. After concern about communism declined, Thongbai
continued to handle high profile cases for outspoken critics of government and made
several trips abroad to defend the rights of ordinary Thai facing harsh criminal justice
in other countries."n
During thirty years of law practice, Thongbai had become the leading defender
of activists persecuted by government. In 1996, he became one of the members of
the drafting committee of the "People's" Constitution, and, in 2000, a member of
Thailand's first elected Senate.
Thongbai's defense of political prisoners made him famous, but the small law
firm he maintained for most of his career was typical of the handful of social justice
lawyers whose careers began near mid-century and took shape under repressive
governments. The untold story of the social cause lawyers of his time, whether they
represented poor people or opposed Thailand's first military dictatorships in court, is
all the more interesting because of the absence of a colonial bar (as in Malaysia), a
common law adversarial system (as in South Africa), or leadership by the judiciary
(as in India). Of the 1700 lawyers reported in the 1960 census, only a handful were
educated in Europe, and Thongbai was not one of them. Even without a tradition of
professional independence or rule of law, Thai lawyers may nevertheless have been
influenced indirectly by Western professional ideals or more directly by sources
within Thai culture-or both. However, Thongbai's statements contrasting his law
practice and the practices of New York lawyers, together with repeated mention of
109. Lese-majeste is a crime defined as affronting the dignity of the monarchy. The critical element is an
affront to the monarchy, usually through speech, rather than the veracity of the representation. The
crime has long since ceased to be meaningful in Europe, but continues to play a role in Thai politics. See
David Streckfuss, Kings in the Age of Nations: The ParadoxofLese-MajestefAs Political Crime in Thailand,

37 COMP. STUD. Soc'y & HIST. 445 (1995).
110. See Thongbao Biography, supra note 107.
111. Id. He received the prestigious Ramon Magasaysay Award for Public Service in 1984. Id.
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the importance of Buddhism in maintaining relationships with clients, complicate
any such inference. Further, in 1984, he expressed a characteristic Thai rejection of
mimicry of foreign social mores when he replied to a proselytizing North Korean
communist at a conference.
I am a Buddhist and the Lord Buddha teaches us to make decisions on our
own, from our own study of the situation, and not to decide by the word of
others, even if they are old and scholarly. I agree that your way may be good
for you, but for Thailand it is different. We have a different way.
Thongbai's professional mission could have many sources, including belief in
Pridi's values of constitutional and public service or emulation of the lawyers in
Western societies, but Thongbai's reference to Buddhism in that reply and in referring
to his relationship with poor clients of his law practice is perhaps more suggestive.
Buddhism is a core element of Thai identity. Thai Buddhism places a unique burden
of moral leadership on Thai rulers, exemplified by their beloved king. Conversely,
scholars have suggested that repugnance for immoral or corrupt leaders, more than
desire for greater rule of law or participation, underlies the mass participation in the
uprisings that have overthrown dictators (as well as the support for military coups
which have served the same purpose). 112 Thongbai's idealism and particularly strong
belief in resisting unjust, oppressive rulers, could have multiple sources, including his
education at Thammasat (which inculcated moral leadership as well as rule of law),
Buddhism, and perhaps least plausibly, emulation of Western professional
independence.
After the October 1973 student uprising, Thongbai played an increasingly
important role by training younger lawyers and defending victims of government
abuse. The student uprising toppled the American-backed dictatorship, opening
Thailand to popular dissent, encouraging social movements, and bringing back the
possibility of constitutionalism-a government committed to basic principles of
conduct. The political opening influenced the aspirations of new law graduates and
created opportunities for them.
C. Somchai Homla-or-The "October Generation"Lawyer
Near the end of his four years as a law student at Thammasat University in
October 1973, Somchai Homla-or and his university schoolmates propelled a conflict
with the government into a confrontation and a mass-movement. Many of his
generation were drawn to left idealists like Mao Tse-tung and in the early 1970s
students at Thammasat had rediscovered and circulated the writings of the
independent Thai Marxist Jit Promlak.
Somchai is the son of middle class parents who grew up in Ayutthaya, the old
capital of Siam, north of Bangkok. His grandfather was a farmer, but his father had
a university education and had worked as an accountant for the government and for
private business. Even before 1973, he was drawn to discussions of social problems
112. See, e.g., Reynolds, supranote 59, at 440-44.
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while in law school, as were many of his classmates. He helped organize the "Rule
of Law Club," which recruited law students" 3 to study social conditions in Thailand
14
and prepared them for visits to the countryside to talk with villagers.
After graduation, he worked for a federation of farmers in the poor, rural
northeast and as a school teacher. The federation was organized by students who
had been involved in the October 14 uprising. Their purpose was to help mobilize
the farmers to achieve land reform. Somchai helped investigate cases of fraudulent
transfer of title to speculators.
They occupied and used the land for generations, and they discovered that
their land is under the title deed of one of the chiefs of the education
department. The people were shocked. So they fight. We checked the
document. We found a long time ago when these farmers were young, officers
came and said they were surveying but didn't say they were issuing title deeds.
So the farmers cooperate. We helped them write a petition to the government
in which we described these facts. And that mobilized the farmers.
Thailand had no administrative courts at that time, and a petition to the Council of
State, which oversees the state bureaucracy, was one of the few remedies available.
[Y]ou have to mention some legal principle-land title, going back to the
king-like public domain. The concept is that the king gives use of the land
to you, not ownership. The concept of private ownership is introduced by the
West.

King Rama V introduced private land to Thai society .

.

. [and]

allocated land titles to members of his family. In principle, if not developed
during ten years, it must be returned to [the] king. The person who actually
exploits the land should have ownership-that was their argument.

The government set up a committee to investigate the claims of the farmers, and
eventually the farmers won return of their land titles from the family of the powerful
bureaucrat who had stolen them, because, Somchai commented wryly, "the family
was probably not powerful any more!"
Somchai was arrested when a military dictatorship returned to power in 1976.
Released on bail, he fled to the jungle to join thousands of other October activists
11 3. This recruitment process occurred until undergraduates were moved from Thammasat's main, central
Bangkok campus to the Rangsit campus on Bangkok's outskirts and could no longer be recruited by
upperclass members. Interview with Prinya Thewanaruemitkul, Vice-Rector, Thammasat University,
in Bangkok, Thailand (Feb. 29, 2008); Interview with Prinya Thewanaruemitkul, Vice-Rector,
Thammasat University, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 14, 2008).
114. In the 1960s, the Rector and Chair of the Economics Department of Thammasat, Puey Ungpakorn,
had been instrumental in organizing a Graduate Volunteer Service, on the model of a similar British
organization, which placed university graduates in community-based organizations in the countryside
to give them better knowledge of their country and to encourage careers in public service. See Thanapol
Eawsakul, Puey Ungphakorn:ABiography, in COLLECTED ARTICLES BY AND ABOUT PUEY UNGPHAKORN:
A SIAMESE FOR ALL SEASONS 361, 366 (5th ed. 2000). According to one source, it is likely that this
organization was made possible by funding from The Asia Foundation. See SOLAK SIVARAKSA, LOYALTY
DEMANDS DISSENT 79, 116 (1998). In the 1970s and 1980s, the Thai Volunteer Service, managed by
Puey Ungpakorn's son Jon Ungpakorn, placed students with non-governmental organizations in an
effort to channel students' careers in a similar direction and to support the growing NGO movement.
Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok (Dec. 21, 2006); see also infra note 119.
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who escaped arrest in the camps of communist cadres on the Thai-Laos border. He
soon became dissatisfied with the communist movement in the jungle and secretly
returned to Bangkok to work underground. He was arrested and remained in jail for
a few years until a general amnesty was declared in 1979.
Though support for dissent against military rule was growing within Thailand,
the international community showed little interest.
At that time [there were] very few international organizations ....
We
know about Amnesty International because they sent the team from Oxford
to the trial of the political activists, the student leaders that were arrested in
1976 and detained for almost three years before being released.
A Thai NGO, the Union for Civil Liberties (UCL), was formed around 1974 by
European educated academics to support the human rights of participants in social
movements.'15 Somchai worked for the UCL after his release from jail in 1980, and
the UCL had close connections with Amnesty International (AI) which was then
monitoring Thai military treatment of refugees on the Thai-Cambodia and ThaiLaos border.
I helped Amnesty International to investigate and the National Security
Council was very angry with me. It became big news for weeks but they did
not mention me by name, but they implied it was me when they gave an
interview.., blamed me, harassed me, somebody follow me. The investigation
became big news ....
Somchai was linked, like Thongbai, with the communist party, but the government
perceived his involvement in a very different way because he had fled to the jungle.
Anticipating arrest for his work with Al, he fled again in 1980, this time to Hong
Kong. It was his first trip abroad. During three years in exile, Somchai became a
fellow for the Asian Human Rights Commission and a trainee for Human Rights
Watch. He studied human rights in other Asian societies. Later, he also met human
rights advocates in the United States. These contacts provided resources that
transformed his career.
When he returned to Thailand, he worked as a voluntary chairperson of the
UCL and joined the Internet Law Firm, which was inspired by a Washington, D.C.,
human rights organization named Human Rights Internet which published a
directory of human rights organizations in the days before the Internet. In addition,
Somchai established a Human Rights Committee for the Lawyers Council of
Thailand" 6 immediately after the ratification of the 1997 Constitution in order to
gather all of the cause lawyers in one place for mutual support. Their legitimacy as a
professional organization grows from the Council's mandate to take cases on behalf
of the needy.

115. See infra pp. 785-86.
116. See Amnesty Int'l, Human Rights Defender in Thailand: Somchai Homlaor (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/human-rights-defender-thailand-somchaihomlaor-20081209.
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The criteria ... are not restricted to these [poverty cases], but ... we mainly
focus on the cases that have an impact on the public, for example, the cases
that really violate the basic principles of human rights. Because we want to
maintain and promote the principle of human rights, so any case that may
revoke or weaken the principle of human rights we will take. The case that
may have some impact on or affect the vast majority of the people or a big
group of the people we will take. We want to empower the people, not just
only to solve the immediate problem. Because we believe that democracy
cannot be built without the people's participation .. .so we identify our role
is one of support for the people's movement.
Within the committee we set up subcommittees on different kinds of rights,
and in the subcommittee we have lawyers and people from NGOs and
academics, because we want the lawyers to work together with them. We
want to be different from the mainstream lawyers .. .you cannot work
alone.
Somchai has faith in the courts, and he urges young lawyers to raise constitutional
rights and human rights in the cases that they litigate.
Judges are independent from the executive branch . . .but they are not
independent from the king.... They are very proud that they act on behalf of
the king .... And to this extent they can check the executive branch. There
is no direct link between the other two powers and the judiciary. They are
quite independent from the other branches. Except some corrupt judges!
He also understands the deeper problem of establishing rule of law-the behavior
of the entrenched bureaucracy.117 A court decision may be required not only to
vindicate the small adjustment of registration regulations to conform with the intent
of the law, but also to empower a lower level government officer to use initiative to
make the change.
Somchai is concerned that there are so few young lawyers in his network who are
self-sustaining; one of his goals is to increase that number." 8 He notes that young
lawyers are difficult to recruit. "They are not our generation. Our generation is
117. He also trains government lawyers and at times uses a different strategy for advocacy to change
government actions, namely by using his good relations with some ministry officials to propose cabinet
resolutions favoring a broad and uncontroversial human rights policy. An example would be a resolution
entitling every child to an education, and then using the resolution to pressure local administrators to
address the need for improved education.
118. In 2006, when I first interviewed him, Somchai said, somewhat regretfully, that his Law Society
network was sustained mostly by an aging corps of only about eighty lawyers countrywide. The limited
interest of the vast majority of private practitioners in supporting, much less working on behalf of, social
justice, human rights, or improvement of the rule of law in Thailand has been a persistent concern.
Somchai recalled just one practicing lawyer who participated in the first years of the UCL, and he left
quickly because it was not his thing. While my interviews suggested that the most active core was far
smaller-at most fifteen or twenty whose names appeared again and again as organizers, trainers, and
leaders of various projects, many others helped with particular projects or handled a small number of
cases. Still others, not part of the network, work in the outlying provinces advising activist groups or
NGOs and providing criminal defense for protesters, Still others serve as leaders, staff members, or
counsel to NGOs.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 531]2008/09

more political." The growing disparity between opportunities for private lawyers for

businesses and the self-sacrifice required to pursue human rights litigation is as much
a deterrent for third and fourth generation social justice lawyers as it was for
Thongbai's. A new internship program funds a few law graduates entering a training

program run by Somchai and his colleagues, but they receive only 3000 baht (about
$100) per month as a stipend."'

He believes that neither the Thai government nor

international funding will sustain their work for long. Somchai has continued to
maintain and extend his international network, allowing him to tap international
funding for his projects and coordinate them with international advocacy. 2 '

Prior to 1973, radical lawyers like Thongbai found a way to make a modest living
while providing services to a poor, underserved, and needy urban population. These
were the exceptional few who survived in spite of the constant threat of jail for
"communist" activities, as Thongbai's experience illustrates.

After 1973, cause lawyers found new roles. A group of activist first generation
practitioners founded the Legal Aid Center Institute to provide services to poor,

needy, and politically marginalized groups who lacked legal representation. 2 ' Two
academics educated in Europe formed the UCL, an organization focused on the
rights of causes seeking to open political space for popular movements. 122 After
graduation, activist second generation law graduates, like Somchai, became

organizers, but they delayed making decisions about the paths of their legal careers
because they had fled to the jungle. Upon returning, their activism continued. The
returning group took up careers shaped by idealism; some becoming organizers in

rural areas,' 23 others joining NGOs spun off by staff members of the Legal Aid
Center Institute who had been mentored by Thongbai's generation,'124 and still others
119. There were nineteen trainees in the program in 2006. Somchai focused recruitment on the need for
human rights lawyers for Thailand's beleaguered Muslim communities. The training was to be held in
the south, the area of Muslim concentration, and many of the participants were from Muslim families.
Another program, the Thai Volunteer Service, was formed in 1980 with a grant from the Asia
Foundation to support the NGO movement by providing a small two-year subsidy to university
graduates working for NGOs. In 2006, Thai Volunteer Service began supporting law graduates working
for NGOs. Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 21, 2006); Interview with
Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 18, 2007); Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in
Bangkok, Thailand (July 8, 2008); see also supra note 112.
120. For example, Somchai's Cross-Cultural Foundation funnels money to many of his projects and the
committees or NGOs that maintain them. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra attempted to
block foreign funding flowing to Thai NGOs that he found politically troublesome by adopting
regulations making direct funding of Thai NGOs from foreign sources illegal. However, Thai
foundations may legally accept foreign funding, and in turn these foundations can fund NGOs.
Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok, Thailand (July 8, 2008); see also Amara Pongsapich,
Thailand,inTHE INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO NONPROFIT LAW 304 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 1977).
121. See

RUANGRAWEE PICHAIKUL & JAMES

R.

KLEIN, THE ASIA FOUNDATION, LEGAL LITERACY FOR

SUPPORTING GOVERNANCE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: ADVANCING
REDUCTION

GooD GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY

146-47; see also
infra note 154 and accompanying text.

122. See infra p. 785-86.
123. See Ungpakorn, supra note 87, at 290-91, 295; Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 88, at 198.
124.

PICHAIKUL & KLEIN,

supra note 121, at 147; see also infra note 153.
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entering government or politics. In the 1980s, a tidal wave of new NGOs marked
the rise of "civil society" in Thailand and laid a foundation for the rapid overthrow of
the 1991 coup and the movement supporting the adoption of Thailand's liberal
constitution in

1997.125

Thus, like Somchai, many cause lawyers in the first and second generations
helped to institutionalize activist roles as providers of direct support for marginalized
and poor individuals, as well as for social movement organizations. They also
provided apprenticeships for the third and fourth generations.
D. Surachai Trong-ngam-The "Environmental"Litigator
Surachai Trong-ngam entered Thammasat University a little less than a decade
after the uprising in October 1973 and is a member of the third generation of cause
lawyers. The Vice Rector of Thammasat University, a prominent scholar and political
pundit who is a half-generation younger and great admirer of Surachai Trong-ngam,
showed me a picture of Surachai when he was in law school in the mid 1980s. In the
picture he has long hair, torn jeans, a red book, and a cloth bag-he looks like a
Berkeley radical. During the period when the photograph was taken, Surachai led
groups of Thai law students to the rice fields near Bangkok to learn about the
people.
Surachai has "attitude" that is expressed in his class-conscious description of his
family, his admission of his own naivet6 and that of other law students who went to
the countryside to lecture villagers on politics unprepared to help with their legal
problems, his continuing commitment to represent social causes, even though his
commitment has meant a life in poverty, and his belief in the causes of the clients he
represents in their fights against the government.
Surachai became radicalized during law school by students and teachers who
believed in human rights and by a personal journey through which he embraced the
legacy of 1973. A thoughtful self-critic, Surachai commented on the naivet6 of law
students armed with a superficial knowledge of Marxism, expecting to have
something useful to tell villagers. He credited the visits with awakening him to
Thailand's social problems, its pervasive poverty and inequality, and the realization
that law school had ill prepared him to understand the legal problems of the rural
poor or to use the law to help them.
Surachai entered law practice in 1987 and worked for an NGO in Chiangmai, in
Northern Thailand, doing "community research" by assessing problems of the youth
and providing social services. While at this job, he gained further experience with
rural communities reinforcing his belief that more specialized expertise was needed
to help them and that an NGO specifically for that purpose would be useful.
Surachai moved to Bangkok where he was employed for a year or two by the
Friends of Women Foundation, an NGO created by a lawyer from the October
generation. In 1994, Surachai joined three other lawyers to establish a small public
interest law firm, Meesit Law Firm.
125. See Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 219-20.
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The purpose was to help the lawyers survive well in their profession and so
continue to do social [cause] work. They did not want to rely on sources of
funding from foreign countries or on being an NGO in order to do social
work. They wanted to find some other ways through being in the legal
profession to do social work.
Each lawyer had experience in social cause practice-labor union representation,
slum advocacy, criminal law-and Surachai brought his experience as a litigator for
the Friends of Women Foundation and his interest in representing communities like
those he had seen near Chiangmai. From the outset, the problem for the Meesit
Law Firm was financial survival.
We try to get some work from the business sector but by nature the business
is about problems related to villagers' cases. We found it difficult to build
good connections with business. We could make money from cases that were
passed on by other lawyers or through a network of relatives and friends. We
thought that if our strength was doing socially important work we should
create this image and try to [sell] it to the public ....

We thought about our

strength in doing social work, and if we want Meesit to grow, we could try to
use our strength to promote Meesit and get social cases in other areas.
Another challenge for Meesit is the reproduction of this kind of law practice.
Surachai acknowledges that it is important to recruit and train younger lawyers, but
this commitment adds to the burden of supporting the partners.
We provide opportunities to learn. Most of the people here were involved in
social activities. We might not be able to fully support the next generation
lawyers. If they can survive here, they must have fewer financial constraints
and family obligations ....

Many might not be able to continue to be here

and will have to leave.
In 1999, Surachai returned to Thammasat University to earn a diploma in Public
Law, which prepared him to represent clients in the new Administrative Courts
created by the 1997 Constitution. Surachai was then recruited by Somchai Homla-or
to join his Human Rights Committee and handle litigation brought to the Committee
by NGOs on behalf of communities resisting private development or government
projects.
In 2001, the New York based Blacksmith Institute proposed to fund an
environmental litigation project in Thailand by creating an NGO called EnLaw.126
126. Interview with Penchom Saetang, Dir., Campaign for Alternative Industry Network, Nonthaburi,
Thailand (June 30, 2008) [hereinafter Penchom Interview]. (Ms. Penchom is a senior activist who
helped establish EnLaw.) Surachai said that an "ideal model" of something like EnLaw had been
discussed within his network for some time, but his network had few international contacts in the
environmental law area. Counterparts in other societies are learning to litigate through networks with
environmental litigators elsewhere. Before EnLaw was established, a global network called ELaw
linked environmental litigators together. ELaw is an environmental litigation project organized by
Professor John Bonine at the University of Oregon. But Surachai's contact with lawyers associated with
ELaw has been limited in part by the fact that he speaks only Thai, and Elaw has had no contact with
other lawyers in Thailand. Blacksmith's proposal was first conveyed to Surachai's network of friends
and NGO contacts by a staff member at Human Rights First. A senior member of the network later
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EnLaw has subsequently received small amounts of funding from other foundations
and the Thai government, and it is closely linked to Surachai's law firm, which

provides the lawyers who work for EnLaw. EnLaw has helped ease the Meesit Law
Firm's financial problems, but only temporarily because the Blacksmith funding, like
so many grants from international sources, was a one-time grant to build "capacity"
in a firm that was expected to become self-sustaining. Surachai explains, however,

that the clients of his firm cannot afford to pay him because they are poor. They
believe in him because he is a community activist, not because he is a lawyer for
hire-to ask them for payment or part of the meager compensation they receive from
court judgments would undermine their trust. Surachai has carefully considered
alternative ways to sustain his work. In addition to occasional non-cause work, he

thinks that the NGO network may be able to provide long-term funding.
Like Somchai, Surachai thinks litigation has become increasingly important for

lawyers defending social causes, especially since the ratification of the 1997
Constitution.
Due to the fact that the establishment of the Constitution in 1997 including
the trend toward development of administrative law, these make it easier for
the people to oversee the state's power by creating more channels for oversight
that the people's movements lack .... Until now, the legal process has been
employed to limit the people's rights. Now, people have their own rights to
use the legal process. The legal process is a channel for people to fight. And
we think we can back them up on this part,

Some of the important cases that have propelled Surachai's reputation appear on the
127

Blacksmith Institute website as illustrations of the global fight against pollution.
To Western observers, Surachai may seem to support the most conventional form of
the rule of law, an "American-style"'12 environmental litigation firm that "plays for
rules."129 He litigates like American-style public interest lawyers, and his litigation
seems to focus on a narrow regime of rights-environmental pollution. But Surachai
does not view this as narrowing his role as an activist. He views his and EnLaw's
mission quite differently from Blacksmith's emphasis on the natural environment.

approached Surachai about becoming coordinator of EnLaw. In spite of his limited connections with
the international environmental law movement, Surachai has received more than adequate expert advice
from his supporting network of Thai scholar-friends.
127. See Blacksmith Institute: Projects, http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/regions/se
visited Mar. 2, 2009).

asia (last

128. By "American-style" I mean an aggressive use of law to initiate litigation to change the rules under
which Thai ministries operate, to expand the statutory interpretations applicable to private firm liability,
or to establish constitutional protections. Perhaps one other firm has recently emerged that aspires to
such practice, but Surachai is far ahead of the curve. Interview with Somchai Homla-or, in Bangkok,
Thailand (July 8, 2008).
129. The term was given meaning by Marc Galanter's seminal essay, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead."
Speculationson the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97-102 (1974). The concept refers to
use of the court's policy making authority by choosing to litigate for the purpose of establishing
precedent rather than merely resolving a conflict or seeking a specific remedy. Id.
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Surachai's mission is supporting community self-determination, and the starting
point is always a community movement.
It's true that these groups arise as a result of our explanations about how to
exercise their rights, letting them see the benefit of legal ways of fighting,
both to protect and to reclaim. If they see the benefit, they can have us work
on litigation. This is the work of networks of villagers, NGOs, and lawyers,
right? They have to understand their movement's friends ....
Mostly, if
they are strong, they tend to be sued anyway ....
They already tend to be

involved in many risky actions. Most of our work supports villagers when
they are about to be sued. Even though we definitely do reactive cases, we
also want to do proactive cases ....

It's the movement's action, so we have to

do it in the form of a group.
He assumes that his own transgressive politics are aligned with his aggressive
litigation.
The problems encountered by Surachai sustaining his law practice for social
change, including a paucity of fee-paying cases, the mismatch between occasional

support from foreign sources and his own goals, and difficulty attracting and
supporting younger lawyers, are typical and help explain the slow growth of cause
lawyering among private practitioners. Although the number of lawyers in Thailand
has increased sharply during the last twenty-five years, 3 ' the number of cause lawyers
in private practice, like Thongbai and Surachai, has not. Aging radical lawyers in
small firms constitute the core of Somchai Homla-or's country-wide network. 3'
While the first generation had few choices other than private practice, after 1973, a
much wider range of employment opportunities existed for idealistic law graduates,
including working for NGOs or combining NGO employment and private practice.

The rising number of cause lawyers after 1973 is due in large part to employment by
NGOs. The new cause lawyers are salaried, at least in the early stages of their
careers, and many have been supported in part by NGOs. Somchai's Human Rights
32
Committee, which has become a focal point for cause lawyering and its reproduction,

1 30. See infra note 151. The take-off period occurred in the late 1970s, shortly after the 1973 uprising. See
MOE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28 (providing statistical data on the number of Thai lawyers).
1 31. It is possible that a few new cause lawyering firms have formed outside of Bangkok. See supra note 128.
I recently learned of another "environmental" law firm like Surachai's, which is less well known and has
kept the Bangkok network at a distance. Although I have asked many sources about this, only a few
provincial cause lawyers have surfaced perhaps ten or fifteen but all part time and none with the
commitment of Somchai or Surachai to build a movement among lawyers or to become identified with
social movements generally.
132. For information on the formation of the Lawyers Council of Thailand (originally named the Law
Society), see KoVILAIKOOL, supra note 70, at 546-47. The creation of the Lawyers Council by
Parliamentary Act in 1985 may not only reflect the desire of practitioners to have their own organization,
but also the symbolic importance of an independent bar in the modern nation state. See, e.g., Heger
Boyle & Meyer, supra note 24, at 71. In addition to the growing importance of private lawyers in one of
the fastest growing economies in the world and its popularity as a field of study, the liberal authoritarian
governments of the 1980s attempted to simultaneously open up political space and to manage it by
encouraging participation without full democracy. The Lawyers Council may be viewed as an attempt
to foster and manage an important aspect of civil society, access to the courts. This goal is reflected in
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has depended on its relationships with NGOs to channel the most important cases to
the Committee for consideration. This loop between human rights activism by
lawyers and NGOs has tightened in recent years because most of the youngest
133
members of Surachai's network are associated with NGOs or work with NGOs.

E. Duean Wongsa-The NGO Lawyer
When I first met Duean Wongsa, she was a young and idealistic twenty-seven
year old about to embark on her career as an NGO lawyer in Chiangmai in northern
Thailand. Today, at thirty, this fourth generation cause lawyer has seen and coped
with more of the rough side of Thai society than the vast majority of her classmates.
She has adapted her idealism to the contradictions of working between state antitrafficking policies and the needs of young Burmese women whom she "rescues,"
sometimes against their wishes.
Duean's family has been a source of inspiration. Her mother worked at menial,
difficult jobs to support Duean and her older sister. Duean has a strong feminist
consciousness of the violence that men perpetrate against women, which may reflect
her family's experience, as well as the influence of her law school mentors, activist
faculty members.
She attended the then new public law school at Chiangmai University. Although
Chiangmai Law School does not have the reputation of the elite Bangkok universities,
it has an exceptional faculty of activists, two of whom served as mentors for Duean.
Both of her mentors were third generation cause lawyers with national reputations as
advocates for northern rural communities, ethnic communities, and other human
rights causes. One served on the board of EnLaw, Surachai's environmental NGO.
The other, a female professor Duean greatly admired, earned a doctor of laws degree
at Cornell University, writing her dissertation under feminist law professor Martha
Fineman's direction, about the continuing struggle for women's rights after the
adoption of Thailand's 1997 liberal constitution.
Duean's first employer, typical of her generation, was a Japanese business firm
where her sister worked as an administrator. She was quickly bored by the work, and
after two years she searched the Internet for something that meant more to her. She
accepted an opportunity to work for a new NGO dedicated to addressing problems
of human trafficking. 3 4 Trafcord, the NGO she works for, receives some funding
from the Thai government, but most of its funding comes from U.S. sources: Open
the Lawyers Council twofold mandate. It was given authority to license attorneys who met certain
qualifications, including a test of knowledge and a period of apprenticeship. At the same time, the
Lawyers Council was made responsible for providing legal services to needy people and given an annual
budget to meet this need. See KoVILAIKOOL, supra note 70, at 546-47. While the Lawyers Council has
the appearance of a modern bar association, unlike bar associations in the United States and Europe, its
political role is very small because the legal profession is still not particularly powerful. Nevertheless, as
Somchai explains, in the hands of the right leader, the Lawyers Council has provided a means of
mobilizing influence.
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
134. She and another classmate are the only two from a class of fifty that are working for NGOs.
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Society Institute (OSI), World Vision Foundation, and the United States government,
which provides support through its Embassy in Bangkok. The Embassy channels
funding under U.S. programs, such as the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
in Persons (G/TIP).'3'
Trafcord is in fact a network of formal and informal relationships among
government and private agencies which collaborate to identify brothels, rescue women
who are held in the sex trade against their will, and prosecute the traffickers.
Collaboration between government and NGO is typical of many NGOs that have
survived for long periods and remained effective. As Duean says, it is a necessary
relationship. She explained that the NGO's founders have experience helping
children and families but no authority to make government officials or brothel
owners cooperate. The government has the authority but no knowledge or ability to
help. The alliance created by Trafcord may be smoother than in other circumstances
because the G/TIP program threatens withdrawal of U.S. aid in countries that do
not comply with U.S. policy.'36
Employment by the NGO is a stage in her career as well as a cause. Duean
explains her cause as providing a service to children, families, and the law-a career
goal with latitude to allow her to envision moving to a larger NGO in a few years
where she can assume greater responsibility. Her long-term goal is to form her own
NGO or private organization to provide services to families. Typical of many in her
generation, Duean can contemplate a career which might not have been possible for
earlier generations of activists.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON GENERATIONS OF CAUSE LAWYERS

The arc of the career of each of the four social justice lawyers was influenced by
perceptions and interpretations of the individuals as well as by the opportunities and
constraints created by their families, institutions, and other relationships. As
individuals, the four lawyers are not alike, nor can they be viewed as representative,
in any statistical sense, of all cause lawyers in the four generations. Yet their careers,
considered together, suggest some of the most likely pathways for cause lawyer careers
in each generation and the social changes that have altered them.
In this Part, I will consider the influence of Thailand's political and economic
evolution on cause lawyering. Four broad, overlapping sources of change emerge
from the career narratives: (A) Thailand's "development," 13 7 its economic growth
together with related changes in education and class structure, (B) the October 1973

135. See U.S. Government Funded Anti-Trafficking Programs, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/c12606.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing a list of U.S. government funded anti-trafficking programs conducted
under Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP)). The initial task force to
implement such programs was created pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000 and is presently under the supervision of the G/TIP. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 7103 (2008).
136. See 22 U.S.C. § 7 104(g) (2006).
137. By "development" I mean rapid social change along a historical path rather than progress toward a
particular set of institutions or social goals.
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uprising, (C) the emergence of the 1980s NGO movement, and (D) the international
flow of resources during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
A. Thailand'sDevelopment
The longer view afforded by time underscores a parallel between Thailand's
modern economic development and the increasing numbers of lawyers (far
outstripping its population increase). Thailand's first public law school was
established in 1933, opening the profession to anyone qualified for admission. Nearly
thirty years passed before a second public law school was established. In the past
twenty years, and especially in the last decade, the number of public and private law
schools has grown rapidly.138 Families of university students have almost always
preferred to have children enter secure government employment, and law students
themselves are typically drawn to high-status public careers as a judge or prosecutor.
Increasingly, students have been attracted to law as an entry point to the rapidly
growing and globalizing business sector. As Daniel Lev has observed about similar
increases in Indonesia and Malaysia, the vast majority of the new recruits are not
deeply imbued with the values of professional independence or the rule of law.3 9 Yet
there are far more cause lawyers in Somchai Homla-or's extended network than
there were in Thailand when Thongbai Thongbao began practicing law.140
Soon after World War II, the United States replaced England as Thailand's
protector and principal benefactor. Initially this was done to secure the United States'
position in Southeast Asia, but it quickly became a Cold War strategy driven by the
United States' desire to make Thailand a developed, free market bulwark against
communism.14' U.S. aid built infrastructure not only to facilitate military needs but
also to domesticate rural areas that might otherwise have fallen under communist
influence. The Thai state grew and penetrated areas that previously had only a
distant relationship to Bangkok, and now had roads, schools, and medical services.
Major U.S. foundations addressed development of higher education and professional
training. The World Bank issued a plan for fiscal management, which was
implemented by Puey Ungpakorn, Director of the Ministry of Finance, later Rector
of Thammasat University and a strong supporter of the student uprising in 1973.142
Business boomed, and rising expectations began to have an important effect on
other development policies of the Thai government. Thailand's growth created new
138. See supra note 97.

139. See Lev, supra note 20. Thai legal education has been slow to modernize, but the limited role for lawyers
derived initially from Thailand's civil law tradition and the historical conservatism of the courts, which
have contributed little to the development of a profession with a sense of independence or power.

140. Somchai's Law Society network was sustained by a corps of approximately eight lawyers countrywide,
see supra note 118, compared to the enterprising three lawyers that began the Legal Aid Center Institute,
see infra note 153.
141. See Hess, supra note 35, at 320, 322.
142. See Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, Puey Ungphakorn, in COLLECTED ARTICLES BY AND ABOUT
PUEY UNGPHAKORN: A SIAMESE FOR ALL SEASONS, supra note 114, at 35-36.
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wealth and aspirations for upward mobility by families who desired to see opportunity
perpetuated for the next generation through better education for their children.'43
American advisors also pressured Thai bureaucrats to improve the education system,
and American philanthropies invested enormous sums in subsidizing and retraining
entire university faculties. 14 4 Between 1961 and 1972, university enrollment increased
from 15,000 students at five universities to 100,000 enrolled at seventeen
45
universities.
Demographic change created a fertile ground for student idealism and
opportunities for idealism to be put into practice. 46 As opportunities expanded,

middle class expectations also continued to rise, creating a politically precarious
environment for Thailand's dictatorship. While university students like Somchai
Homla-or discovered new ideals that directed their opposition to authoritarian

government, Thailand's emerging middle class wanted economic opportunity, and
when the dictatorship could not deliver in the early 1970s, they provided crucial
support for the student revolt in 1973.'

A comparison between the number of cause lawyers at mid-century and at
century's end is problematic because the very concept of a cause lawyer varies among
the generations. Prior to 1973, some lawyers who worked in important positions for

government shared many of the sentiments and values expressed by Thongbai.'4 8
While we might pause before calling them cause lawyers, one of the most important
characteristics of contemporary Thai cause lawyering is its use of insider connections
143. Id. at 149-52. Surachai's career was influenced in this way by the expansion in educational opportunities
during the 1960s and 1970s. Surachai's family is poor, but a university education was not beyond his
grasp or, more importantly for general political development, his family's expectation.
144. See Hess, supra note 35, at 329, 335, 339. Aid from the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and
Carnegie Foundation transformed higher education in Thailand. Puey Ungpakorn, Chair of
Thammasat's Economics Department from 1964 to 1972, began with a department of six which grew to
over one hundred faculty members by the time he resigned. See Eawsakul, supra note 114, at 365.
During the same period, U.S. philanthropies opposed U.S. support for pro-U.S. dictatorships in Latin
America by funding human rights, reflecting a political split among elites in the United States. While
there was opposition to the war in Vietnam, there was far less opposition to U.S. support for Thailand's
repressive military governments. Philanthropies may have viewed Thailand as underdeveloped and
needing basic social welfare and educational reforms that would lead to development of a free market
economy and democracy. Put another way, Thailand may have drawn less concern about human rights
because it was perceived as unready for them while South American societies were perceived as
fundamentally European in origin and closer to the United States in culture and politics. Amnesty
International sent observers to the student trials in 1976. Interview with Thongbai Thongbao, in
Bangkok, Thailand (June 22, 2008). Additionally, congressional hearings in 1977 concerned the
wisdom of continued arms shipments but not human rights issues in Thailand. See Ewasakul, supranote
114.
145. ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 149. During this decade, professional occupations increased more rapidly
than any other occupational group. Id. at 150 tbl. 7.1.
146. See id. at 154.
147. Id.
148. Confidential interview with former high ranking government prosecutor, in Mahasarakham, Thailand,
(June 26, 2008).
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to accomplish what would be otherwise impossible through the courts. Whether

such insiders who share some of the objectives of traditional cause lawyers are truly
capable of "speaking law to power" raises difficult questions about cooptation of
dissent. The issue is particularly difficult conceptually and empirically in Thailand
where until mid-century the existence of a bureaucratic polity meant that all elite

factions were employed by, or otherwise closely linked to, the state and its
administration.

After the 1973 student uprising, political idealism carried law graduates in many
different directions, but not into the private practice of law. Many of the most radical
students in the uprising thought the human rights discourse of some of the professors

who supported them was too conservative and too Western. 149 The legal profession
began its rapid growth in the late 1970s, but this rapid growth in the overall number
of lawyers did not necessarily mean a similar increase in the number of cause

lawyers.'
Undoubtedly, the general opening of Thai society, more than political
idealism, generated a surge in the number of lawyers entering private practice. The
same opening created an opportunity for Somchai and others to use their legal

training to help the socially oppressed and to found institutions that promoted the
use of law to support social movements.' Soon, however, many of the most radical
law students, like Somchai, fled to the jungle, postponing any thought of a
professional career.
But of course that is the point. Before 1973, few individuals trained in the law
who sympathized with opponents of government chose to invest in a career that

involved deploying the law against the stateY.2 As time passed, and changes occurred
149. Human rights advocated by some Thammasat faculty, as well as liberal democratic ideas about
development supported by Puey Ungpakorn, Rector of Thammasat (who was a protector and supporter
of the students), were considered too Western by many students who were influenced by the models of
liberation closer at hand in Vietnam and China, and who embraced Maoist political theory.
150. In 1960, there were fewer than 2000 legal practitioners in Thailand. Between 1970 and 1975, the
number increased by a little more than 125 lawyers a year from 2541 to 3177. After 1975, the number
of lawyers increased to about 7000 in 1980, or more than 750 each year. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra
note 27, at 159. The rate of increase is currently in the range of 3000 new lawyers every year. There are
currently over 54,000 licensed lawyers in Thailand (or roughly one fifth the per capita proportion of the
United States), about twenty percent of whom are women. See Lawyers Council of Thailand, http://
www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/directory/data/E07-Lawyers-Council of Thailand.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2009).

In 1980, the Ministry ofJustice estimated that the number of lawyers was approximately 7000.
supra note 27, at 159. The Lawyers Council registered more than 19,000
lawyers by the year 1986, the first year after it assumed responsibility for licensing practitioners. See
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK,

Letter from the Office of the President of the Lawyers Council of Thailand to author (July, 1, 2008) (on
file with the author). The take-off in numbers actually began a few years before 1980, just as the
"October generation" of students who participated in the 1973 uprising graduated and began their
careers, suggesting that not only was there an increase in students electing to study law, but also,
perhaps, more graduates from law school were choosing private practice. See supra note 97.
151. See discussion infra at Part V.C.
152. Other lawyers accompanied Thongbai to prison in the late 1950s, and Thongbai himself trained young
lawyers beginning in the late 1960s. Lawyers emerged from the historical shadows to help establish the
Legal Aid Center Institute and defend students arrested by the military in 1975 and 1976. Oral history
suggests that there were no more than a handful of lawyers ready to commit a substantial amount of
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in the relationship between the state and "civil society," more roles for cause lawyers
emerged.
B. The October Revolution-From Private Practiceto Institution Building
Although four years after the uprising the number of new lawyers entering the
profession began to grow rapidly, many of the most idealistic law graduates from the
October generation, like Somchai, left Bangkok to work directly with villagers in
other capacities. Even though many activist law graduates of the October generation
postponed their legal careers, radicalization of the profession began immediately.
The previous generation of embattled private practitioners together with Westerninfluenced intellectuals formed two organizations to formalize, expand, and
reproduce a more liberal role for law. A handful of practitioners from Thongbai's
generation established the Legal Aid Center Institute, an organization dedicated to
providing legal services to poor persons.'53 The Institute's lawyers focused on legal
of the
assistance, but, equally important, it became the training ground for many
54
next generation's activist practitioners and founders of important NGOs.1
The UCL, the second institution organized by first generation cause lawyers and
other activists, radicalized the bar in a different way. The UCL, also formed soon
after the student uprising, was founded by a group of Western-trained faculty at
Thammasat University and Chulalongkorn University. Its founders were not
exclusively lawyers. One of the founders, Professor Saneh Chamarik, educated in
Britain, became Thailand's most prominent human rights theorist and the first
chairman of the National Human Rights Commission.S' Another founder, Gothom
Arya, a participant in a 1968 student movement in Paris, was a young member of the
Chulalongkorn University Faculty of Electrical Engineering. A few years later,
Gothom founded Thailand's first human rights organization. 116 Soon branches of
time to assisting victims of the dictatorship, helping rural people oppressed by government or land
owners, or representing labor unions and social movements. An oral history undertaken on behalf of
The Asia Foundation names three lawyers associated with the Legal Aid Center Institute. See
PICHAIKUL & KLEIN, supra note 121, at 146-47. During my interview with him, Thongbai recalled just
a few who helped him defend students at Thammasat University in 1976.
153. See id. My interview with the son of one of the founders also suggests that the Institute was focused on
law practice rather than on community education, policy development, and other activities that have

characterized many of the "Thai-style" NGOs founded during this period. The Institute has disappeared
with the last of its founders in the 1990s. See id. at 147. Interestingly, Thongbai was never a part of the
Institute but attempted to operate his own training program for younger attorneys and even sought

funding from The Asia Foundation for this purpose in the 1990s.
154. Id. at 147.
155. See Interview with Saneh Chamarick, Chairperson, Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n of Thailand, in
Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Saneh Interview]. See generally Office of the National
Human Rights Commission of Thailand Home Page, http://www.nhrc.or.th/index.php?lang=EN (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009); Asia Pacific Forum website, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/apfmember-categories/full-members/thailand (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
156. Saneh Interview, supra note 155; Interview with Gothom Arya, Professor, Chulalongkorn Univ., in
Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 22, 2006). During the repression following reimposition of dictatorship in
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the UCL were established by similar groups in other cities, including Chiangmai
and Ubon Ratchitani. Thus, both the Institute and the UCL were organized by first
generation Thai cause lawyers and activists as an expression of their idealism and
aspirations for the rule of law. They provided direct support for marginalized and
poor individuals as well as social movement organizations, and they provided
apprenticeships for third and fourth generation cause lawyers.
To Americans, the English translation of the UCL name may suggest that it is
Thailand's own American Civil Liberties Union, but the UCL's mission has been
quite different. Unlike the ACLU, which has focused on protecting freedoms named
in the American Bill of Rights, the UCL had no national legal charter to orient its
work nor was the concept of human rights commonly used or generally understood.
Instead, the UCL supported social movements by, for example, assisting labor
organizations to organize, educating workers about their rights, disseminating
information about new rights, and providing criminal defense. After 1976, its work
frequently brought it into conflict with the government and under suspicion of
communist influence. 57
While the first generation established institutions, the October generation
pursued a different path that, in the long run, led back to cause lawyering. Many
lawyers of the October generation left the university and became organizers who
sometimes used their legal skills. Other law graduates, some who had been in the
jungle, founded NGOs of their own, supporting the rising tide of mobilization in
poor urban and rural areas. Still others, particularly those who could attract foreign
philanthropy, formed policy-directed NGOs, such as the Friends of Women
Foundation and the Center for Protection of Children's Rights-and are now senior
members of the "Thai-style" NGO movement." 8
Somchai's career is quite distinct from careers of first generation activist lawyers.
Influenced by his early experience in a powerful social movement, he has selfconsciously grounded his work in a strategy for social change, namely attracting and
training progressive lawyers to support social movements of the people. Since his
exposure to an international community of human rights advocates in the late 1980s,
he has been key in building a network of human rights lawyers in Thailand. He has
divided his energy between mobilizing legal support for important cases, creating
space for the defense of human and civil rights by networking with friends in
1976, Professor Gothom formed, with American assistance, the Coordinating Group for Religion and
Society (CGRS), which was apparently Thailand's first human rights organization. CGRS was the
97
only domestic human rights organization permitted to function during the repressive post-1 6 regime
Interview
with
Sarawut
Protoomraj,
and became a training ground for future human rights lawyers.
former CGRS volunteer and currently one of two UCL staff lawyers, in Thailand (June, 2007).
157. See, e.g., JOHN V. DENNIS, JR., THE FORD FOUND., A REPORT TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL
OFFICE OF THE FORD FOUNDATION ON POSSIBLE FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THAILAND

(May 11, 1987) [hereinafter

FORD FOUNDATION REPORT]

(on file with author) (recommending funding the Women's Center at Chiangmai University but advising

caution with respect to the UCL because its members were not known to work well with government).
158. For a discussion of "Thai-style" NGOs, see infra Part V.D.3-5.
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government, and reproducing the current generation of activist lawyers through
training and finding support for younger lawyers.' 59
C. The NGO Movement
Third generation law students drawn to cause lawyering, like Surachai, entered a
field that had taken shape through the work of the October generation, especially
Thammasat University's own graduates. Surachi's career provides an instructive
illustration because the network of student and faculty ties formed during law school
continued to influence Surachai's career long afterward, helping to direct him to jobs
and to fund his practice.
Like many third generation cause lawyers, Surachai had an opportunity to begin
working as a salaried staff member of an NGO. He worked first for a "community
research" NGO in the north, and within a few years, through his network, he found
ajob with the well-established Friends of Women Foundation as a litigator. Through
his network of friends he was also working with other NGOs, including Alternative
Energy Projects for Sustainability (AEPS),16 ' an NGO that helps communities
threatened with environmental, social, and economic disruption by Thailand's
program for building power plants. After working for the Friends of Women
Foundation for a year, Surachai joined a small law firm whose partners had experience
working for labor organizations, slum movement groups, and other social causes.
His work for NGOs was a productive apprenticeship for developing basic skills and
learning about the roles he could play as a cause lawyer in private practice.
A few years after joining the firm, Surachai's network, specifically his contacts at
AEPS, brought him another opportunity: coordinator for EnLaw, the environmental
NGO established by the New York-based Blacksmith Institute. He was selected
because of his prior work with AEPS and his reputation as a litigator. Cases which
he had worked on for AEPS with the support of Somchai's Human Rights Committee
became the first projects handled by the new NGO, EnLaw. Over time, Somchai
drew Surachai more deeply into the work of the environmental subcommittee of the
Lawyers Council. Gradually Surachai became well known in the cause lawyering
community, and to the public at large, based on his litigation victories"' and the
close relationship between the Human Rights Committee and the NGO community.
He has become the "go to" lawyer for anti-development suits based on environmental
laws 162
159. Currently he is creating a new foundation which will supplement the salaries of young lawyers who
cannot otherwise earn a satisfactory living as cause lawyers.
160. A former staff member suggested that funding for AEPS might have come initially from Sulak
Sivaraksa's support for environmental causes through the Komol Khemtong Foundation. Interview
with Ida Aroonwong, staffmember, Alternative Energy Projects for Sustainability (AEPS), in Bangkok,
Thailand (June 17, 2008).
161. See Blacksmith Institute: Projects, http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/regions/se-asia
visited Mar. 2, 2009).

(last

162. Recently, the Thai government recognized his expertise in environmental law enforcement by offering
him a grant to conduct research leading to law reform. Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in
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Duean's career, representative of fourth generation cause lawyers, exemplifies the
new opportunities the NGO movement has created. She is a female, salaried NGO
staff attorney. While an elite Women's Bar Association163 has existed for many years,
there were few female cause lawyers before the 1980s. This is hardly surprising in a
male dominated society. Perhaps what is more surprising is the emergence of women
in generations three and four (since 1980) as NGO directors and lawyers pursuing
careers that combine both cause-clients referred by NGOs and private for-profit
practice. One explanation for this may be that women's interests are more aligned
with the those of a well-established sector of the NGO community-the Foundation
for Women, the Friends of Women Foundation, the Center for Protection of
Children's Rights, as well as NGOs that focus on women workers, prostitution, or
16 4
sex-work.
The progress of the NGO movement also reflects a change in the fourth
generations' perception of their role in political movements. Duean is not motivated
by the anti-authoritarian political ideology that motivated the first generation of
cause lawyers, the lawyers from the October generation, and the third generation,
those like Surachai who embraced the October generation's legacy. Surachai (the
third generation environmental lawyer), like Somchai (the October generation
institution builder), was motivated by political idealism. Surachai explained the
purposes of litigation as a form of support for community movements, not as
environmental protection. Environmental law is simply a tool for achieving an
essentially political objective. At the opposite extreme, the desirability of salaried
apprenticeships for NGOs also draws recruits with less desire to be a cause lawyer
than a desire to gain experience and move on. 6 ' Duean says her responsibilities are
to the "king and the law." She is among the first to view cause lawyering as fully
inside the mandate of the profession rather than at its margin or in opposition to the
government. Cause lawyering, for Duean, if she is indeed a cause lawyer, is a
"normal" career.

D. Globalization and Hegemony
Among the sources of influence on cause lawyers, the hegemony of Western
ideas and resources has been the most intensely observed and theorized by progressive
Bangkok, Thailand (June 16, 2007); Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in Bangkok, Thailand (Feb.
2, 2008); Interview with Surachai Trong-ngam, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 29, 2008).
163. Virada Somswasdi Interview, supra note 73.
164. This may also reflect the opportunities available to women. While the number of women enrolling in
law schools has greatly increased-now approaching fifty percent-it is likely that as compared to men,
women's opportunities to join private firms are more limited. However, there is no reliable data for this
hypothesis.
165. There are, of course, many reasons why a younger staff lawyer would want to move on, such as the
extraordinarily high work volume and low pay. These are familiar barriers to recruiting cause lawyers
worldwide for all but the elite U.S. public interest law firms and foundations.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 53 12008/09

scholars. As described in Part II, some theories place globalization and hegemony in
a more positive perspective than others. Risse and Sikkink are among those who
view hegemonic standards and economic leverage as the engines that move advocacy
along the spiral path toward human rights compliance. 6 6 Dezalay and Garth, and
many others, likewise view international resources and pressure as critical leverage in
human rights empowerment. 16 7 Comparing career narratives permits an examination
of a wide range of global connections and resources and their direct or indirect
influence on the indigenous network of advocates. Consideration of the changing
paths of careers highlights the critical importance of increasing access to higher
education. Comparing careers influenced by a range of funding programs, together
with their embedded contingencies (such as cooperation with government), restricted
objectives (forbidding pursuit of other objectives), or an assumption that a few months
or years of "capacity building" will lead to a self-sustaining "deliverable," allows us to
assess the influence of foreign investments on survival of particular advocates, goals,
168
and methods of advocacy.
1. Global Resources
Globalization is a shifting array of mutual influences among societies. 169 In this
article, the focus will be on policies of governments, philanthropies, and international
actors (including both networks and organizations) intended to affect the institutional
performance or development within Thailand. Aid, expertise, diplomatic pressure,
and philanthropy flowing from the United States and the World Bank have
predominated since mid-century, but European countries, Canada, Australia, and
especially Japan have also played increasingly important roles. 7 °
Global resources play important and varied roles in cause lawyer careers. Scholars
Dezalay and Garth suggested that Latin American human rights lawyers required
global funding and legitimation to survive because law had little legitimacy and little
independence within the institutional frameworks of the countries they studied.
From another perspective, Risse and Sikkink, and their collaborators, derived a spiral
model of global influence from case studies, according to which international
166. See supra text accompanying note 38.

167. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Dezalay and Garth have argued that Latin American
political institutions remained relatively closed to independent legal advocacy for empowerment absent
international connections. Id.
168. Still other important effects of global influence on progressive advocacy are beyond the scope of my
research, for example, global support for international or private regulatory regimes, or the potential
undermining of domestic governmental regulatory regimes through bilateral trade agreements enforcing
the terms of private development by international corporations.
169. See supra text accompanying note 30. The evolutionary process is described as three waves occurring
over many centuries.
170. See Hess, supra note 35 (discussing aid flowing to Thailand from the United States and World Bank);
Worapol Promigabutr, The Logic of Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Its Impact on Thailand's Postwar
Development (June 1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with
author).

GLOBALIZATION, INVESTING

IN LAW, AND THE CAREERS OF LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL

CAUSES

sanctions work in tandem with domestic human rights advocates to "spiral" up
pressure to increase the space for both rights and advocacy. While a broader
canvassing of cause lawyering in Thailand may support these hypotheses to a degree,
the four narratives examined here suggest important qualifications for both
theories.
As the Cold War ended, many other aid and advocacy organizations entered the
scene of what was a predominantly American-influenced development. The attention
of governments and philanthropies turned to "capacity building," civil society, and
rule of law aid intended to stimulate development of private institutions and
governance. 7' Aid and other forms of intervention no longer flowed almost
exclusively to government institutions (including educational institutions), but found
partners outside government bureaucracies. While the most dramatic shift in dollars
flowing to Thailand has been the reduction of American military aid after the 1980s,
equally significant has been a shift from funding government to funding activities in
the private sector. 7 2 Paralleling this rise in civil society funding, networks of
connection began to form between Thai and foreign advocates and NGOs. Just as
"third wave" globalization has involved influential exchanges of governance
knowledge and resources from the top down, this phase of globalization has also
involved influential exchanges of advocacy knowledge and resources from the bottom
up.

173

171. Hess, supra note 35, at 329-32; Carothers, supra note 34. "Capacity building" is a new catch-all term
referring to improvement in the institutional capacity of organizations in developing countries, from
government agencies, to trade organizations, to human rights or environmental NGOs. See, e.g., United
Nations, Capacity Building for Local Governance, http://esa.un.org/techcoop/flagship.
asp?Code=SAF99001 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (describing the UN's call for improved local governance
capacity in South Africa). The concept responds generally to Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass
North's call for emphasis on institutional development and increased rule of law capacity as a foundation
for economic development. See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Speech
upon receipt of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Dec.
9, 1993), availableat http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html.
172. See Hess, supra note 35. Data from websites and archives of the following agencies were compiled to
obtain a half-century perspective on American funding for Thailand: USAID, Ford Foundation,
Rockefeller Foundation, The Asia Foundation, The Foundation Center (including grants by the Open
Society Institute and the Carnegie Foundation). See, e.g., Ford Foundation Grants, http://www.
fordfound.org/searchresults?thailand (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing list of grants, including
amount of funding and specific programs made to Thailand); Rockefeller Foundation Grant Search
Results, http://www.rockfound.org/grants/GrantSearch.aspx?keywords=thailand (last visited, Mar. 1,
2009) (providing list of approved grants and a synopsis of the program); USAID Regional Development
Mission for Asia: Thailand, http://www.usaid.gov/rdma/countries/thailand.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2009). Some agencies, notably The Asia Foundation, the United States Embassy, Ford Foundation, and
Rockefeller Foundation, have local staff members who are friendly with and even integrated into local
advocacy and NGO communities. Some have had long term relationships with the community of
potential beneficiaries. This is true of government agencies as well, like the staff of the United States
Embassy, which sometimes holds points of view that are closer to the Thai NGO community than to
Washington policy makers. Interview with Ben Svasdi, Dir., Trafcord, in Chiangmai, Thailand (July
6, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Trafcord Director]; Interview with staff member, United States
Embassy, in Bangkok, Thailand (Jan. 29, 2008).
173. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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More important than the total aid flowing to Thailand is the manner in which
interventions occurred: to whom, for what activities, and with what effect? Some
changes in legal institutions have been significant and supported to some degree by
funding from abroad, including the establishment of special courts for domestic
relations, intellectual property, and labor; the drafting and ratification of the liberal
1997 Constitution; the adoption of an administrative court system; the promotion of
a "green bench" to handle environmental cases; and the promotion and adoption of
new organic laws for criminal cases, environmental law, and women's rights (all
relevant areas of cause lawyering concern).
The effects of these globalization influences on cause lawyering are indirect and
symbolic until put into practice, and their everyday meaning, or as Merry says, their
meaning in the "vernacular,"'74 may be better understood through the experiences of
cause lawyers. Thongbai Thongbao's early career was seemingly influenced very
little by globalization. His childhood preceded globally financed development of the
Thai countryside, and his education was exclusively in Thai schools. Yet Thammasat
University was indirectly a product of modernization, created by a Western-educated
idealist who believed in constitutionalism and democracy, and who intended
university education to inculcate values of public service and government under law.
Thongbai was inclined at an early age to embrace both of these values, even if not
precisely in the way envisioned by Pridi. Thongbai's early successful confrontations
with military dictatorships which launched his career may have been subtly
intertwined with the United States' efforts to moderate Sarit's brutality, but there is
no direct evidence for this.' 7 ' International human rights advocates did not express
concern about Thailand until 1976.176 And though Thongbai received much
international recognition for his defense of human rights, and in 1984 was a recipient
of the prestigious Magasaysay Award for Public Service' 77 at this stage in his career
he had already gained knowledge, power, and legitimacy for his work. Yet Thongbai's
early belief in government accountability and in the rule of law were clearly influenced
both by twentieth-century westernization of Thailand's legal system and new political
ideals, such as Communism, as well as by more traditional Thai values underlying
Buddhism and reverence for the monarchy.
Somchai Homla-or, like Thongbai, was educated exclusively in Thailand, but
Somchai attended school in the "American Era" of intellectual fervor and rising
174. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

175. Sarit, the dictator who arrested Thongbai, was usually particularly brutal toward opponents. BAKER &
PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 169, 173. Yet Thongbai and other political prisoners were treated
relatively well in prison. Thongbai may have been genuinely respected by the military and the police, as
he claims, or as a journalist he may have worked for a publisher with some influence in Sarit's regime.
If American influence was also being exercised behind the scenes to moderate Sarit's bloodthirsty rule,
we have no evidence that the United States was concerned about Thongbai.
176. American philanthropy never involved funding the defense of human rights in Thailand as it had in
Latin America. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 357 (describing the purpose of American
philanthropy in Latin America).
177. See supra note 111.

GLOBALIZATION, INVESTING

IN LAW, AND THE CAREERS OF LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL

CAUSES

expectations.178 Two of the most important Thai student leaders of the 1973 uprising
had just returned from an American Friends Field Service fellowship in the United
States. China's break with Russia in 1960, and the ensuing years of rapid economic
growth, was capped by Mao Tse-tung's unleashing of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution in 1966, inspiring youthful idealists everywhere, especially in nearby
Asian societies. 179 Nevertheless, Somchai did not have direct contact with, or receive
support from, global resources until his exile from 1987 to 1989, when he began to
form a network of contacts with human rights advocates and sources of future
funding. Somchai's return in 1989 coincided with the growing power of the NGO
movement and, soon after, the overthrow in 1992 of a military dictatorship and the
national movement toward a more meaningful and liberal constitution. The 1997
Constitution, together with his networking through the Lawyers Council, provided
a powerful cause lawyering mechanism. Somchai built a network of lawyers, urging
them to use the new rights in litigation to push the courts to give them meaning.
Further he has employed his international contacts to increase Thailand's connection
to human rights movements elsewhere; for example, he became co-founder of Forum
Asia and was its first Secretary General. From his international contacts he has
drawn resources for his network, providing funding for the training of young lawyers,
for advocacy projects on behalf of migrants and stateless people, and for the defense
of libel cases against the media.
Surachai has networked far less with international social cause advocates than
Somchai,5 ° but his Thai network with NGO staff and academics has provided
important global resources. Service-oriented NGOs often receive funding from
American and European sources, and indeed some of Surachai's NGOs were founded
with such seed money. The Friends of Women Foundation, where Surachai made
many contacts, was one such NGO. EnLaw, the NGO that definitively shaped his
career, if not his identity, was created at the suggestion of an American foundation,
which offered funding for environmental litigation. Typical of much international
funding, the EnLaw grant was a one-time grant that has not been renewed. EnLaw
has received no further funding from international sources and struggles to support
its activities. Less apparent from funding patterns alone, Surachai has networked
internationally with other environmental litigators, although his principal sources of
legal expertise have been unusually creative Thai academics. Like Somchai,
Surachai's focus on litigation has meant that changes in the law and constitution
have potentially great significance for his practice. The litigation that he began
before EnLaw was created is derived from a law adopted by Thailand in the early
178. Western-educated leaders and intellectuals like Puey Ungpakorn, then Chair of Thammasat University's
Department of Economics and Rector of Thammasat University, believed in liberal government and
greater democracy as well as in free market development. Student idealism was shaped by international
events, including the rebellion by Parisian students in 1968, the U.S. anti-war movement driving
American presidential politics, and the Great Proletarian Revolution in China in 1966.
179. See JONATHAN D.

SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA

440, 602 (1990).

180. Command of foreign language is an important key to networking internationally. Surachai speaks no
foreign language, while Somchai is fluent in English.
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1990s to comply with an international environmental accord.' 8' Although the
community rights and public participation provisions of the 1997 Constitution
remain largely rhetorical, even after recent adoption of a community rights organic
law, the creation of an administrative court system created a valuable resource for
cause lawyers. Surachai filed the first case in administrative court, and subsequently
has won decisions against agencies for failure to develop adequate standards for public
protection against toxic waste and environmental hazards.'82 He has been among the
first to push the administrative courts to articulate new standards in order to make
existing law clearer and stronger.
Duean's career has been influenced more than the other three by international
advocacy and funding.'83 Trafcord, her current employer, is a project initiated by the
Thai government and a British-Thai philanthropist (who is the project's director but
not a founder), and supported almost entirely through international organizations:
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
World Vision, and most importantly, the United States Embassy. Unlike the other
three lawyers, Duean is an employee whose work is directed by others. Thus,
priorities attached to funding for Trafcord have an important influence on her work
and Trafcord priorities are particularly sensitive to U.S. funding for anti-trafficking
and prostitution.
2. Dependence and Independence
The career narratives enable a careful reassessment of Dezalay and Garth's
hypothesis that the viability of cause lawyering is highly dependent on global support
to sustain and legitimize cause lawyers' careers. 8 4 The view from Thailand is more
textured. Thongbai had little contact with global advocacy in the formative stages of
his career, and his legitimacy seems to have come from other sources. Similarly,
Somchai Homla-or's early career may have been influenced in its early stages by
idealism inspired, in part, from movements outside of Thailand and the increasing
availability and cosmopolitan influence of university education, supported in
significant part by American philanthropy. But not until much later in his career did
he receive direct support from international funding, networking, or legitimating
181. Interview with Amnat Wongbandit, Professor, Thammasat University, in Bangkok, Thailand (June 19,
2008). For information on relating to the environmental law adopted by Thailand, see PCD: National
Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 1992, http://www.pcd.go.th/info-serv/en-reg-envi.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).
182. See, e.g., Pennapha Hongtong, Pollution Control Department Ordered to Pay Compensationfor Klity
Villagers, THE NATION, July 5, 2008, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/05/07/
national/national_30072401.php; Apinya Wipatayotin, Klity Creek KaranAvardedB743,000, BANGKOK
PosT, May 7, 2008, available at http://archives.mybangkokpost.com/bkkarchives/frontstore/search
result.html?type=a&key=Klity&year=2008.
183. Her first job was with a Japanese business. Her second, and current, job is with an American-funded
human trafficking NGO.
184. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 354-57. Dezalay and Garth found that cause lawyers in Latin
America are highly dependent upon on global support. Id.
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recognition of his work. Duean's career is most thoroughly intertwined with global
funding and international pressures to address the problems of human trafficking,
and even her NGO, which through its funding is closely linked to American policies,
receives essential network support and legitimacy from the Thai government.
Surachai's career is a particularly interesting case study for Dezalay and Garth's
hypothesis. Surachai's experience supports their hypothesis that global support is
important. His career also shows that notwithstanding a funder's goals, the recipient's
own, somewhat different goals may continue to guide the use of the resources.
Support from the Blacksmith Institute for environmental litigation has transformed
his career, bringing him success as a lawyer and national recognition as an expert
litigator and a people's lawyer. Surachai has become a litigator of environmental law
cases, but protection of the environment is not the cause he represents. Nor is he
dependent upon international resources. He has expanded the field of cause lawyering
and its legitimacy in Thailand, and though still not adequate for his needs, he receives
support from Thai sources, including support from the Lawyers Council and
government support for research projects. His environmental litigation is
opportunistic, but his perspective is broad and idealistic, and it is motivated by his
understanding of poverty, exclusion, and communities as "environmental" issues.
3. Cooptation by TANs
Career narratives also suggest that the "spiral model" proposed by Sikkink and
her colleagues does not fully appreciate the effectiveness of some types of rightsoriented, local advocacy in overcoming government resistance to the recognition of
rights. Thongbai's defense of civil liberties and Somchai Homla-or's advocacy for
human rights are quite consistent with global movements for human rights. But
global pressure directed toward Thailand on human rights issues has had little
apparent influence. Although Thailand's abuses of human rights are well-documented
by Human Rights Watch, the Asian Human Rights Commission, and other
watchdogs, neither the incidents identified nor the institutional weaknesses
underlying them have become a major focus of global pressure.'
Where global concerns intersect with local advocacy, a further problem is
apparent, namely a misalignment between global and local goals. Surachai's
environmental law advocacy appears to parallel the goals of well-established
environmental advocacy by large, international NGOs such as the International

185. Activists in close touch with the realities of Thai institutional performance provide trenchant criticisms.
For example, the performance of the police has repeatedly drawn criticism. Even United Nations
recommendations have been ignored. Asian Human Rights Commission, Thailand: UNRecommendations
Matter, July 24, 2006, http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/653/; see also
Awzar Thi (pen name for a staff member of the Asian Human Rights Commission), Thai PoliceAre Best
Organized Criminals, UPI ASIA ONLINE, Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://www.ahrchk.net/ahrc-innews/mainfile.php/2008ahrcinnews/1853/. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticized Thailand
for human rights violations related to drug interdiction, treatment of refugees, and suppression of
Muslim unrest in the south. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007: EVENTS OF zoo6, at
329-39 (2007), http://hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf
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Union for Conservation of Nature and the Wildlife Fund.'86 These large NGOs
specialize in establishing relationships with the highest level of government that can
be used to mobilize action to remedy problems brought to light by grassroots
advocates." 7 But Surachai's concerns are not their concerns. While they work on
forest management, trafficking in animals, water and air pollution, Surachai has
little concern for the larger pattern of environmental quality regulation. Instead, like
many of the lawyers working at the grassroots in Thailand on human rights issues,
he is concerned about popular democracy, and the results that count for him are
gains in popular participation and government accountability. A potential alliance
between cause lawyers for communities threatened by development and global
defenders of the environment might be possible, but Surachai's career narrative
suggests that a wide gap still exists in Thailand between local and global advocacy.
4. Winners and Losers
These four careers illustrate many types of global influence but leave open the
question of its impact. By century's end, not only had the number of cause lawyers
increased, but their careers were more varied, including small private law firms,
university faculty, and a wide variety of NGOs, which ranged from "Thai-style"
partnerships with government to NGOs emphasizing social movement support. The
increasing number of cause lawyers is associated mostly, but not exclusively, with the
growing number of lawyers working for NGOs rather than an increase in the number
of lawyers in self-sustaining private practices. An impact of global funding might be
described as picking "winners" and "losers" among potential cause lawyers. Funding
and legitimation may be provided at critical moments when a cause lawyer or project
would not otherwise survive, or be initiated at all. Surachai's EnLaw project is one
example of funding that has reshaped a cause lawyer's career. Duean's employment
by Trafcord is the clearest example. But the narratives also illustrate the independence
of much cause lawyering work, its local support, legitimacy, and impact apart from
global resources.
If survival is one measure of the impact of funding, a second measure is its effect
on what cause lawyers do. Thai scholar Amara Pongsapich has suggested that Thaistyle NGOs that cooperate with the government rather than oppose it have
contributed little to the end-goal of cause lawyering, namely expanding political
space. 8' Funding from international sources, especially the United States, favors
organizations perceived as capable of cooperating with government rather than

186. See, e.g., IUCN Asia Regional Office, http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretariat/offices/asia/asiawhere work/thailand/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); World Wildlife Fund Environmental
Conservation Work in Thailand, http://www.panda.org/who we-are/wwf offices/thailand/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009).
187. Interview with an officer of the WWF Thailand, in Bangkok, Thailand (July 27, 2008). He described
the general methods used by large environmental foundations.
188. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 226.
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expanding political space directly through public opposition to government policies." 9
Understandably, perhaps, U.S. funding favors strengthening government capacity
and contributing to interest group advocacy consistent with U.S. policy initiatives,
such as drug interdiction and human trafficking prevention rather than political
party or mass movement support. 90 More surprising, perhaps, is the parallel focus of
private funding, which continues to complement U.S. policies. "Development," as
interpreted by almost every American and European philanthropy, means
development of routine, non-contentious citizen participation.' 9' This emphasis
might be deemed appropriate in a society with an open polity and tolerance for
political dissent. Restricting funding for advocacy to such purposes in a society
where the means and goals of dissent are far more limited and contested may actually
undermine the most important purpose of social cause advocacy and cause lawyering,
namely making change possible.
5. Contingent Funding: Thai-Style NGOs
One of the puzzles of cause lawyering, indeed a question raised frequently about
the rule of law, is whether law can truly limit the state's power. Duean works for an
NGO that partners with government agencies to enforce the law and resolve
important conflicts in the government's policies for dealing with trafficked women.
We might ask then, why is Duean a cause lawyer at all, if she sees herself not an
opponent of government power but its ally?
The term "Thai-style" NGO was entirely new to me when I began this project.
A "Thai-style" NGO is typically a network which coordinates the efforts of
professionals from public and private agencies to address a social problem. 19 2 Their
uniqueness arises from an ambiguous relationship with the government: sometimes
strenuously opposing and at other times helping to implement government policies,
sometimes training government personnel, sometimes operating under a contract
with a government ministry, and sometimes using Thai government or foreign aid in
ways officially disapproved of, but tacitly condoned in order to make a policy more
189. While this has certainly been true for U.S. philanthropy and foreign aid, some European governments
and foundations have been bolder. For example, it is well known that DANIDA, the Danish
development agency, funded the organization that for a time blocked construction of the Thai-Malaysia
pipeline. Penchom Interview, supra note 126.
supra note 96, at 11-13; ROBERT MUSCAT, THE FIFTH TIGER: A STUDY OF THAI
(1994). Funded projects include academic projects, legislation development, and
informing citizens of their rights, but not social movements, direct political action (such as lobbying) or
political organizing. See generally The Asia Foundation: Projects, http://asiafoundation.org/project/
projectsearch.php?country-thailand (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).

190. See

MUSCAT,

DEVELOPMENT POLICY

191. See Hess, supra note 35, at 323-24. Targets for funding in the mid-1980s were selected in part based on
whether they had a record of cooperating with government. The UCL was considered a questionable
target because of its history of conflict with government. Although not mentioned in the report, the
consultant's assessment may well have been influenced by the suspicion of "communist" leanings
attached to leaders like Somchai Homla-or. FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 157, at 39-42.
192. "Thai-style" is not an official term. It describes NGOs that have a certain collaborative style while
adhering to a social cause; they are usually aware of the risks of compromise.
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consistent with the needs of a vulnerable population. 193 Therefore, they are often
concerned with social policies that are ill-served by existing government programs
and which foreign governments and international philanthropies find appealing for
their own political or humanitarian reasons.
Trafcord, Duean's employer, makes an illuminating case study. Trafcord was
described by one Asia Foundation staff person as the best Thai-style NGO. The
independent wealth of Trafcord's founder has allowed him to dedicate his career to
social issues in Thailand, initially helping HIV/AIDs victims and, as an outgrowth,
"rescuing" primarily women, and occasionally men, who have been trafficked for sex
work and labor.'94 While Thai police tend to downplay the importance of trafficking
in relation to "real" crime, other Thai ministries have been deeply concerned about
the welfare of women. The Thai government has typically lacked the will and
capacity to overcome these conflicts and to act effectively without external funding.
In 2007, a high level Thai governmental commission addressed this policy incapacity
by creating a mandate in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
under which Thai police, military, and welfare agencies must cooperate in addressing
the problem. Trafcord became the agency with sufficient credibility to attract foreign
funding and sufficient expertise to direct government officials assigned to the
problem.
Foreign governments and philanthropies have provided a great deal of aid for
trafficking interventions. For example, the United States has provided funding to
aid sex-trafficking intervention, but the funding came with strings attached reflecting
the conservative values of the Congress and the Bush administration.19 These
strings limit the objectives and methods of intervention by criminalizing prostitution

193. Thai-style NGOs serve many of the covert policy functions that U.S. fiscal federalism is said to serve in
the administration of its social welfare policies: helping to reconcile conflicting mandates, making
discretionary choices that would be difficult to make at a higher, more public level of decision making,
or by simply ignoring formal constraints that make a policy unworkable-with all of the accompanying
hazards. For discussion of U.S. programs exhibiting this pattern of delegation, see John P. Dwyer, The
PathologyofSymbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990); Joel F. Handler, "Constructingthe Political
Spectacle'- The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligation in Social Welfare History, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 899, 942-43 (1990).

194. Interview with Trafcord Director, supra note 172. Initially, the problem of prostitution involved two
flows of migrants, one from poor rural families to the brothels of Bangkok during the Vietnam War,
and a second flow from Thailand to Europe, America, and elsewhere to work in the sex trade or low
wage sweatshops. Both problems continue, but now new sources of trafficking have become a major
concern in Thailand, namely the flow of poor Burmese and Laotian women into the sex trade. Id.
195. Consistent with President Bush's conservative social agenda, the Bush administration obtained
legislation to condition anti-sex trafficking aid to developing countries on compliance with conditions
requiring, among other things, criminalization of prostitution but offering no assistance to relieve
poverty, which is often a root cause of women's involvement in sex-trafficking. See supra note 135. See
generally Edi C. M. Kinney, Appropriationsfor the Abolitionists: UnderminingEffects of the U.S. Mandatory
Anti-prostitution Pledge in the FightAgainst Human Trafficking and HIVAIDS, 21 BERKELEYJ. GENDER
L. &JusT. 158 (2006).
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and punishing offenders rather than by addressing the underlying problems196 by
helping potential victims through better education, poverty relief, or pregnancy and
19 7
disease prevention options before traffickers take them.
While Trafcord is unique in having such a high-level mandate, other Thai-style
NGOs have filled similar policy and enforcement gaps and added their own emphasis
to government policies by providing expertise and advocacy, while avoiding rancorous
conflict with government agencies. As a result, they are often among the most
trusted outsiders, capable of intervening when Western-style hired gun advocates fail
to gain an audience with officials. Thai-style NGOs blur the lines of public and
private, insiders and outsiders, by acting under or against government authority.
Unlike the bureaucratic polity at mid-century, which constituted a political space
closed to all but powerful elites, NGOs like Trafcord define a different kind of
political space in which exercise of governmental authority is textured by relationships
with trusted outsiders who possess expertise or access or resources to make government
policies work and, in many cases, to relieve external political pressure.'98
In turn, the ambiguous political space occupied by NGOs, such as Trafcord, also
creates ambiguous roles for lawyers who work for them. Duean's commitment to
"king and the law" may be understood not only as her understanding of Trafcord's
mission, but also as an expression of her belief in the morality of government and its
leadership. Duean says she is the trafficking victim's legal advisor. She often is the
only lawyer on the scene or at any subsequent proceeding unless she recruits another
attorney to appear in court for the victim. Yet she says her duty "is with the law."
Although Duean might not characterize her own conduct as coercive, she uses her
position as Trafcord's lawyer and the victim's advisor to persuade reluctant women to
testify against their former traffickers in spite of the risk of retaliation and in spite of
the belief of some women that they are "voluntary" workers. That is precisely why
she is an idealist and a cause lawyer. Her duty to the law is a moral mission, not
technical assistance. She also coerces resistant police and military to obey the terms
of the MOU. She and her co-workers have built a powerful network of higher
ranking officials within each participating agency, and she deploys her insider
connections and commitments to bring officials, as well as victims, into line with the
law.

196. Because trafficked women typically come from very poor families, some sex workers "voluntarily" enter
the trade to earn wages. Most, it has been argued by foreign funders, are coerced, and many feminists
claim that sex work by desperately poor women, and perhaps any woman, can never be voluntary.
197. The emphasis of the Bush administration's so-called "ABC" policy has been quite the opposite. "ABC"
stands for "Abstain, Be faithful, use Condoms." Yifat Susskind, African Women Confront Bush's AIDS
Policy, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1207-30.
htm.
198. Although I noted the analogy between devolution in Thailand and the symbolic politics of devolution
of difficult policy choices within the American federal system, the relationship between government
and Thai-style NGOs is not merely symbolic devolution of responsibility but without real power to alter
policy. Because of the limitations of contemporary Thai government administration, the relationship is
often one of symbiosis, not domination.
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VI. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL SPACE AND NETWORKS OF LAW

Until recently, courts in Thailand rarely opened space for social change.' 99 All
four of the cause lawyers discussed in this article said that the government's failure to
follow law is an important reason for their work. Thai cause lawyers, including the
four discussed in this article, often devote as much effort to changing the government
from the inside as they do to assisting confrontation between the government and
outsiders or to "playing for rules." Yet they approach collaboration and confrontation
in different ways.
In contrast to Duean Wongsa, Somchai Homla-or and Surachai Trong-ngam
describe their work as support for people's movements. Their strategy is long term.
In practice, much of what they do supports NGOs, attempts to enforce laws that are
on the books, or pressures the judiciary to make constitutional rights more than
principled rhetoric. They have advised groups locked in confrontations with the
government, but they also have worked with government through Thai-style NGOs,
like the Friends of Women Foundation, which employed Surachai, received
government funding to train government officials in human rights, and advised
ministries about policy. Their justifications for cause lawyering are political, yet
their work is complex and involves some of the same puzzles as Duean's work.
Pongsapich argues that opening space for change has been the first priority of
social movement. Historically, political space for popular participation has been
limited, 2°° and progress toward more open political space has occurred through a
"bottom up" process of popular political involvement, which breaks the pattern of
limited participation. Expansion of political space has been achieved during three
periods of collective popular resistance to authoritarian rule and subsequent
negotiations for changes in norms of governance by "civil society" organizations-the
overthrow of the monarchy in 1932, the October revolution of 1973, and the uprising
that ended the military dictatorship in 1992.201 Successful confrontations have been
characterized by increasingly outspoken criticism of authority; mass demonstrations,
often bloody reprisals by the military, police, and right wing groups; and the moral
collapse of an authoritarian government. Courts, and rule of law, have played only a
marginal role in opening political space at these times. In the aftermath, a new
constitution may reflect the "constitutional moment," but new rights depend on real
gains in power by organizations representing the people.
According to Pongsapich's theory, the power of ordinary people, and a key to
20 2
opening political space, lies in "thickening" networks of civil society organizations.
199. See Vitit Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law andAspects of Human Rights in Thailand, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 32, at 346, 360-64.

200. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 216.
201. Amara Pongsapich argues the network is thickening and getting stronger. The two most important
periods of "negotiation" have been 1973-1975 and 1992-1997. This 1992-1997 period has yielded
politically engaged "civil society" organizations. Id. at 236-37.
202. Non-elite, political engagement in Thailand at any level through privately organized communities,
interest groups, or nation-wide collective action was quite rare, partly because of the absence of
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Somchai Homla-or and Surachai Trong-ngam embrace a similar evolutionary theory
of political development, viewing the rule of law as an important tool to open political
space for communities and popular movements to negotiate with the government.
But Professor Pongsapich believes that the civil society organizations that count are
those that oppose the government, not those that cooperate. Thai-style NGOs,
including most NGOs funded by international agencies, have contributed only
marginally, if at all, to opening political space. She views their work as a classic case
of cooptation by the government, rendering them unable to influence the framework
of governance in the long run. Pongsapich's theory of political change through social
movement activity has important implications for the role of cause lawyers.2" 3
Pongsapich's theory may indeed provide insight into both everyday negotiations
between cause lawyers and powerful agencies and the momentous negotiations that
transform the constitutions governing civil society.20 4 The results of everyday
collaboration with the government may be more complex and more significant than
she anticipates; the dependency between the government and Thai-style collaborators
is often two-way. The opening for constitutionalism in the 1990s was in part a result
of stronger NGOs and more confident popular leaders. As a consequence, Thongbai
Thongbao, the combative human rights litigator, became a member of a constitutional
drafting assembly in 1996 and was elected to be a senator in 2000, career capstones
no one could have predicted when he began his career in Lad Praow prison in the
1950s.
All of the cause lawyers described in this article have worked for Thai-style
NGOs and the government. They have worked not only as trainers and teachers, but
underlying "civil society" organization. Few interest groups existed above the level of family or
community agricultural cooperatives and non-participatory governance did not encourage formation of
groups for participation in politics. The emergence of citizen groups that can influence policy or politics
has been quite recent. As described previously in the text, during the "American Era" in the 1960s and
1970s, student groups began to form and some rural communities began to mobilize against development.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Since 1973, "civil society" has grown rapidly through
community organizing and NGO building by committed advocates, formation of political parties after
parliamentary democracy began to become established in the 1980s, and still more recently, formation
of political action groups mobilizing mass support to influence Parliament and government. In more
established democracies, civil society organizations have existed in greater numbers over longer periods
of time, often growing out of long standing communities of interest, collectively representing a wide

array of non-political and political interests, and having deep roots (i.e., their existence is widely known
and organizing is wide-spread and ongoing). In Thailand, these organizations have a much shorter
history and are linked almost exclusively to advocacy. Coloring public perceptions is the fact that a
great many NGOs, including "Thai-style" NGOs, have received substantial support from sources
outside of Thailand.
203. See Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 217-20.

204. The classic case study of "cooptation," in the management of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
projects, describes relationships between a public project and the seemingly less powerful local agencies
TVA AND THE GRASS RoOTs: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
(1949). Yet the lesson of the TVA was not that the larger federal authority
prevailed, but precisely that its purposes were altered by its need to accommodate local needs brokered
by local organizations. Through the influence of local organizations, local interests altered the course
and influence of the project.
and actors. See
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as legal advisors, defenders of the rights of staff, organizers, and the people they
serve, and, as Duean's work for Trafcord illustrates, missionaries spreading respect
for law and public morality among lower level government officials. Against the
backdrop of institutional resistance, "civil society" organizations have grown in
number and legitimacy, and therefore have an increasing ability to mobilize dissent.
While a careful examination of the growth of civil society in Thailand is beyond the
scope of my present discussion, it is not hard to imagine that small gains won by
cause lawyers and other advocates might help provide the foundation for mass
mobilizations of the kind that led to important constitutional moments in Thai legal
25
development. 1
Thongbai Thongbao, Somchai Homla-or, Surachai Trong-ngam, and Duean
Wongsa have different ways of reconciling a social vision with the limited capabilities
of Thai law. Duean acts for "king and the law," Somchai and Surachai act "for the
people" and communities, and Thongbai Thongbao's law practice enforces moral
limits that even authoritarian rulers, and their police and military, respect. The
viable forms of cause lawyering have multiplied as social change has created new
career opportunities, and, with the broadening opportunities for practice with a
social vision, the variety of visions of the transformative possibility for law have
increased. In different measures, these visions blend traditional and legal authority,
formal and substantive goals, and change and continuity of Thailand's traditions of
governance.
Underlying each vision is a conflict between the pull of authority under a
European-style social compact reflected in law and respect for traditional authority
symbolized by the monarchy and a Buddhist regard for others. Opening political
space and strengthening the rule of law have often involved collaborating with
traditional authorities, and strengthening them as well, sometimes on the cause
lawyers' terms. Mass protests that led to three "constitutional moments" were not
aimed at bringing down the structure of the traditional Thai state. During the three
significant moments of expansion of political space a sense of proportion quickly
returned without revolution and bloody reprisals against elites. Political change came
about through negotiations that simultaneously established the responsibilities of the
government and the legitimacy of the government-its authority was restored on
20 6
new terms.
205. I am deeply indebted to Nick Cheesman whose stimulating and thoughtful insights about Thai politics
and rule of law are based on many years of work as a human rights advocate in Burma and Thailand. I
owe to him the suggestion that Asian societies, like Thailand, with a history of bureaucratic governance
and authoritarian politics, create governance systems that allow small gains through processes that
absorb the efforts and energy of human rights advocates who devote proportionately less time to more
meaningful institutional change. It might be argued further that a political morality of paternalistic
governance, as in Thailand, plays a role in creating a system of small gains and (perversely) limiting the
expectations of advocates. In the text, however, I argue that such a system need not lead to profound
cynicism about change because small changes of the right kind may incrementally build capacity to
undertake larger changes.
206. Pongsapich, supra note 88, at 223-27. While the rights of the people may have played a role in this
process, their role is likely to have been wholly different from modern Western conceptions of
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By viewing cause lawyers solely through their collaboration with government and
Thai-style NGOs, we may be inclined to conclude that they participate in a system
of small gains while failing to address major defects in the rule of law because of the
law's lack of legitimacy or the absence of a powerful court system. Such criticism
may misunderstand their vision of a good society because, as citizens of the Global
North, our own consciousness of constitutional limits and law is different. Rule by
powerful, and ideally, moral elites is deeply ingrained in Thai culture. The rule of
law has been embraced as a corrective mechanism for some of the system's worst
abuses, but "top-down" change cannot remake the meaning of authority, leadership,
or legitimacy embedded in everyday life without a deeper transformation that
Thailand has never attempted or desired. Social hierarchy still plays an important
role in governance. Ambiguous, Thai-style collaboration with government may
make sense to cause lawyers under many circumstances because it blends the rule of
law with the social relationships they value, creating a new culture of governance and
opportunities for change. Further research about cause lawyers, their social vision,
and the Thai institutions they seek to transform will reveal more about the validity
of the suggestive implications drawn from these career narratives.

constitutionalism and rule of law based on a passive acceptance of the legitimacy of authority and may
be closer to the direct popular participation of Americans during the American Revolutionary War.
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